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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
ESSAYS ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND ADVISORS
In my first chapter, I examine how index funds vote their proxies on firms in its
index that their family does not hold in its actively managed funds. For a given
proxy proposal at a given point in time, I find that an index fund is more likely
to oppose management on shares its family does not hold in its active funds than
on shares its family does hold in its active funds. I further demonstrate that index
fund governance has positive effects on the probability a proposal passes and on
shareholder value. In my second chapter coauthored with Will Gerken and Steve
Dimmock, we document the prevalence and variety of frauds committed by investment
managers. We show that prior legal and regulatory violations, conflicts-of-interest,
and monitoring disclosures available via the Security and Exchange Commission’s
Form ADV are useful for predicting fraud. Additional tests show that fraud by
rogue employees is more predictable than firm-wide fraud, but both types of fraud
are significantly predictable. We revisit the fraud prediction model of Dimmock and
Gerken (2012) and test its performance out-of-sample (using fraud cases discovered
since that article’s publication). We find the model has significant predictive power for
the out-of-sample cases. To encourage additional research in this area, we have made
the data used in this chapter publicly available at https://doi.org/10.13023/nsjd-rk62.
In my third chapter, I find the divergence ratio, the percentage of time funds within
a family vote differently from one another on the same proposal at a shareholder
meeting, varies significantly across fund families. Funds of families in the highest
divergence quintile realize alphas up to 104 basis points higher than funds of families
in the lowest quintile. These findings are consistent with the separating equilibrium
theory of Evans, Prado, and Zambrana (2017) who find that some families encourage
coordination among their funds while others encourage competition.
KEYWORDS: Mutual funds, governance, indexing, advisors, fraud, misconduct
Author’s signature: Joseph Farizo
Date: April 14, 2020
ESSAYS ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND ADVISORS
By
Joseph Farizo
Director of Dissertation: William C. Gerken
Director of Graduate Studies: Paul Childs
Date: April 14, 2020
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to thank my Dissertation Committee: Will Gerken, Chris Clifford, Igor
Cunha, Adib Bagh, and my outside examiner Yoko Kusunose. I extend a special
thanks to the chair of my committee, Will Gerken, for his numerous suggestions,
insightful comments, and constant encouragement, as well as the faculty members
who served as the director of graduate studies for my degree program: Kristine
Hankins and Russell Jame. Finally, I extend warm thanks to Jordyn, Carla, David,
Angela, Kevin, Jensen, Alex, Joseph Farizo Jr., and fellow finance PhD students for
their endless support.
Chapter 1 benefited from comments and discussions with seminar participants
at the SEC DERA PhD Student Symposium (2018), the Eastern Finance Associa-
tion Annual Meeting (2019), the Financial Management Association Annual Meeting
(2019), the Financial Management Association PhD Student Consortium (2019), the
University of Kentucky, the University of South Carolina, The College of New Jer-
sey, Towson University, Salisbury University, the University of Richmond, and The
Citadel. Chapter 2 benefited from comments by the editors of Corruption and Fraud
in Financial Markets, Carol Alexander and Douglas Cumming. Chapter 3 benefited
from comments by seminar participants at the University of Kentucky.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
Chapter 1 (Black)Rock the Vote: Index Funds and Opposition to Management 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Research Setting and Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2.1 Proxy voting as a research setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2.2 ISS Voting Analytics Database . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2.3 Sample and Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3 Index Funds and Engagement in Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3.1 Univariate Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3.2 Multivariate Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.3.2.1 Index Fund Ownership and Opposition to Management 12
1.3.2.2 Controlling for Firm Quality: Firm Fixed Effects . . 12
1.3.2.3 Controlling for Proposal Quality: Proposal Fixed Ef-
fects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.4 The Effects of Index Fund Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.4.1 Election Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.4.2 Implications for Shareholder Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Chapter 2 Misconduct and Fraud by Investment Managers . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.2 Related Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.3 The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and Mandatory Disclosures . . 42
2.4 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.4.1 Investment Fraud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.4.2 Form ADV Data and Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.5 Predicting Fraud and Misconduct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.5.1 Predicting Fraud by Investment Managers . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.5.2 Interpreting the Predictive Content of the Models . . . . . . . 50
2.5.3 K-Fold Cross-Validation Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.6 Predicting the Initiation vs. the Continuance of Fraud . . . . . . . . 51
2.7 Firm-Wide Fraud vs. Fraud by a Rogue Employee . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.8 Out-of-Sample Prediction and Model Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.9 Policy Implications and Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
iv
Chapter 3 Mutual Fund Voting Divergence and Performance . . . . . . . . . 72
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.2.1 CRSP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.2.2 Factor Realizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.2.3 ISS Voting Analytics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.3 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.3.1 The Divergence Measure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.3.2 Regression Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.3.3 The Capital Asset Pricing Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.3.4 The Four-Factor Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.3.5 The Six-Factor Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.3.6 The Stambaugh & Yuan Mispricing Factors Model . . . . . . 78
3.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.4.1 The CAPM and Four Factor Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.4.2 The Six-Factor Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.4.3 The Stambaugh & Yuan Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.4.4 The Stambaugh & Yuan Four- and Six- Factor Models . . . . 80
3.4.5 Summary of Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
Appendix A: Variable Definitions for Chapter 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
Appendix B: Variable Definitions for Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
Vita . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
v
LIST OF TABLES
1.1 Rates of Voting Opposition by S&P 500 Index Funds . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.2 Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.3 Differences in Active and Index Fund Opposition to Management . . . . 22
1.4 Opposition Rates Across the Family Does Not Hold Actively Distribution 24
1.5 Index Fund Ownership and Opposition to Management . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.6 Index Fund Ownership and Opposition to Management: Firm Fixed Effects 28
1.7 Index Fund Ownership and Opposition to Management: Proposal Fixed
Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.8 The Effect of Index Opposition on Election Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.9 The Effect of Index Opposition on Abnormal Returns . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.1 Summary of Investment Fraud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.2 Summary of Fraud Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.3 Summary of Investment Advisory Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.4 Predicting Fraud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.5 Initiation versus Continuance of Fraud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.6 Firm-wide versus rogue employee fraud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.1 Divergence Ratios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.2 Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.3 CAPM and Four-Factor Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.4 Six-Factor Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.5 Stambaugh & Yuan Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.6 Stambaugh & Yuan Four- and Six-Factor Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3.7 Differencing Columns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
vi
LIST OF FIGURES
1.1 The Growth of Index Ownership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.2 Overlapping Holdings and Family Does Not Hold Actively Shares . . . . 36
1.3 Distribution of Funds by their Overall Rate of Opposition to Management 37
2.1 Timeline for Fraud Committed by Veros Partners . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.2 Fraud Cases over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
2.3 Model Diagnostic Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
2.4 Model Performance over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
vii
Chapter 1 (Black)Rock the Vote: Index Funds and Opposition to
Management
1.1 Introduction
Do index funds engage in governance? The recent rise of index investing and con-
temporaneous fall in active fund ownership underscores the increasing relevance of
this question. By the end of 2018, index funds held approximately 18% of the market
value of domestic equities, up from 3% in 2000. Over the same time period, active
funds’ ownership of the U.S. stock market nearly halved to 11% (see Figure 1.1).
An op-ed in The Wall Street Journal warns against this growth of indexing, arguing
that “passive” index funds adopt a hands-off approach to governance and allow firm
management to become progressively unchecked:
“American investors are increasingly acting on the realization that a
broad-based indexing strategy is superior to investing in individual stocks
or actively managed funds. That’s great news for investors, who will pay
less and get better returns. But it has troubling implications for corpo-
rate governance. No passive investor cares much about governance of a
particular company.”1
A perceived lack of incentives for index funds to engage in governance fuels these con-
cerns regarding the growth of indexing. Index fund management fees as a percentage
of total net assets are low relative to actively managed funds, perhaps curtailing their
involvement in costly monitoring activities (Black, 1998; Iliev and Lowry, 2015). Ad-
ditionally, an index fund ultimately yields the return of its underlying benchmark
regardless of its level of participation in governance activities. This could dissuade
monitoring involvement because the fund individually bears the costs of governance
but shares the benefits of governance with competing funds that have identical invest-
ment objectives (Grossman and Hart, 1980; McCahery, Sautner, and Starks, 2016;
Shleifer and Vishny, 1986).
There are, however, a number of reasons why an index fund might be incen-
tivized to participate in active governance of its portfolio firms.2 First, monitoring
activities are linked to an increase in firm value (Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas,
2008; Cuñat, Gine, and Guadalupe, 2012), and firm value enhancements are linked to
higher cash flows to institutional investors through management fees (Lewellen and
Lewellen, 2018). Additionally, several studies show that investors value governance
and sustainability (Dimmock, Gerken, Ivković, and Weisbenner, 2018b; Hartzmark
and Sussman, 2019; Riedl and Smeets, 2017), implying that institutional investors
1“Index Funds are Great for Investors, Risky for Corporate Governance.” M. Todd Henderson
and Dorothy Shapiro Lund. The Wall Street Journal. June 22, 2017
2In this paper, active governance refers to participation in governance by either actively managed
funds or index funds. I use the terms active funds and actively managed funds interchangeably to
describe any fund that has discretion over buying and selling decisions of its portfolio assets.
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may be able to use monitoring activity to attract investors when competing for flows
(Fisch, Hamdani, and Davidoff Solomon, 2019). Finally, index funds may have a
strong incentive to monitor the firms in their portfolio because they are not always
able to sell out of positions when they disagree with management. Index funds may
be more inclined to exercise their “voice” by voting, since “voting with their feet”
through divesting shares is not always possible if those shares represent ownership in
a company that is a member of the fund’s underlying index. The head of Investment
Stewardship and a principal at Vanguard, Glenn Booraem, commented on this rela-
tionship between index investors and firm management, stating “we’re riding in a car
we can’t get out of. Governance is the seat belt and air bag.”3
In this paper, I find evidence that index funds on average do participate in active
governance by voting their proxy shares. Specifically, I find index funds are more
likely to vote proxy proposals against firm management on shares their family does
not hold in active funds than on shares its family does hold in active funds. Thus,
despite concerns that index funds do not care about the performance of their holdings,
I uncover an even higher level of engagement in proxy governance on shares a family
only holds its index funds than on shares their family has an active position in.
Figure 1.2 illustrates my identification strategy. The hypothetical fund family
depicted in the figure consists of five funds: two index funds A and B, and three
active funds X, Y, and Z. The unshaded circles represent shares that are held only by
the family’s actively managed funds, or Family Holds Only in Active Funds shares.
The hash-marked circles are Family Holds in Index & Active shares, because these
firms are held both by the family’s active funds and the family’s index funds. Finally,
the dark circles represent Family Does Not Hold Actively shares, or those shares that
this family holds only in its index funds. In this paper, I compare how index funds
vote their proxies on Family Does Not Hold Actively shares such as BAC, XOM, and
JPM in this example to governance on Family Holds in Index & Active shares such
as FB, V, and GOOG.
In Table 1.1, I present the average quarterly rates at which the 25 largest S&P
500 funds in my sample vote against management of their portfolio firms. Overall,
these funds oppose management 5.9% of the time (Column 1). However, they appear
friendlier to management on Family Holds in Index & Active shares, opposing 5.5% of
the time, than on Family Does Not Hold Actively shares, where they submit dissenting
votes 9.0% of the time (Columns 2 and 3). Only Columbia and Federated’s S&P 500
index funds are friendlier to management on Family Does Not Hold Actively shares
than Family Holds in Index & Active shares, as indicated by the negative difference
between these average rates of opposition presented in Column 4. Thus, at least in this
modest sample of popular S&P 500 funds, I uncover evidence of engaged monitoring
by index funds on those shares these institutional families hold exclusively in their
index funds.
My identification strategy overcomes many of the empirical challenges of identify-
ing governance by index funds. Extant studies frequently use the Russell 1000/2000
3“Meet the New Corporate Governance Power Brokers: Passive Investors.” Sarah Krouse, David
Benoit, and Tom McGinty. The Wall Street Journal. October 24, 2016.
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reconstruction methodology to link index and institutional ownership to corporate
governance.4 Yet, there is considerable debate regarding the application, reliability,
and biases of this Russell 1000/2000 strategy. Wei and Young (2017) find pre-existing
discontinuities in market capitalization prior to index reconstruction and argue that
the results of papers using the reconstruction methodology are attributable to bias
rather than a treatment effect. Further, Wei and Young (2017) emphasize that some
papers employ a regression discontinuity approach (Chang, Hong, and Liskovich,
2015; Crane, Michenaud, and Weston, 2016) while others use an instrumental variable
design (Appel, Gormley, and Keim, 2016, 2019). Boone and White (2015) also docu-
ment an increase in actively managed fund ownership around this Russell 1000/2000
cutoff, particularly among “quasi-indexers” or active funds that closely mimic an
index (Cremers and Petajisto, 2009). This may obscure the effects of index fund
ownership on monitoring choices and may instead capture the rise of overall institu-
tional ownership, both by active funds and index funds.
Focusing on Family Does Not Hold Actively shares in an index fund is useful for
three additional reasons. First, voting behavior by index funds on these shares is
more likely to be free of active fund influence. An index fund voting in opposition
to management on Family Holds in Index & Active shares may not represent true
monitoring by the index fund if the fund family’s active funds dictate how the family’s
index funds are to vote at company meetings.5 When a firm is added to an index, any
observed change in governance structure at that firm might not be due to monitoring
by index funds but rather by active funds that already held those shares who now
leverage the increased size of their fund family’s voting bloc. Second, my analysis
does not focus on only those firms near the index cutoff or firms that switch from
one index to another. In particular, the firms in my sample need not have a market
capitalization that places them near the Russell 1000/2000 breakpoint. My results
therefore uncover governance by index funds at firms that may not have been in
previous analyses.
Third, my research design allows me to incorporate a rich set of fixed effects in
multivariate tests that control for firm and proposal characteristics. A firm that
4Each year, Russell Investments ranks the largest 3,000 firms to construct its Russell 1000 (R1K)
and Russell 2000 (R2K) indexes. The R1K consists of the largest 1,000 firms by market capitalization
while the R2K includes the next 2,000 largest firms. Because these indexes are value-weighted, firms
at the bottom of R1K comprise a very small portion R1K index whereas firms at the top of the R2K
make up a substantial portion of the R2K index. A researcher could therefore compare firms at the
bottom of the R1K to the firms at the top of the R2K under the assumption that these firms are
similar apart from their index inclusion. Alternatively, a firm’s movement from the bottom of the
R1K to the top of the R2K can instrument for index ownership.
5The merger of Towers Watson & Co. and Willis Group Holdings PLC provides an illustrative
example. As a large shareholder of Towers Watson, BlackRock possessed a pivotal vote in this
merger. BlackRock’s index funds reportedly wished to vote against the merger plan, but managers
of BlackRock’s active funds persuaded the index funds within their family to vote in favor of the
deal (“Meet the New Corporate Governance Power Brokers: Passive Investors.” Sarah Krouse, David
Benoit, and Tom McGinty. The Wall Street Journal. October 24, 2016). In this instance, votes
by index funds did not necessarily represent true governance by index funds. Rather, it indicates
influence by active funds within the index fund’s family that had an interest in the outcome of the
vote.
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in one family is classified as Family Does Not Hold Actively may simultaneously be
classified as either Family Holds Only in Active Funds or Family Holds in Index &
Active shares by other institutions at the same point in time. Revisiting Figure 1.2,
the stock BAC is classified as Family Does Not Hold Actively for this hypothetical
family. However, at the same point in time, it may be held by an active fund by
another family. This variation allows me to include firm and firm-year fixed effects in
a regression framework. I can therefore observe how variation of the Family Does Not
Hold Actively measure for many institutions holding the same stock at the same point
in time influences the voting choice by institutional investors. The incorporation of
these fixed effects absorbs other sources of variation that might have an effect on
whether a fund votes against a firm, such as the company’s past performance, board
structure, governance provisions, or other time-invariant firm characteristics that
could explain a fund’s decision to vote in opposition to management.
Similarly, Family Does Not Hold Actively varies within the proxy proposal itself.
As an example, consider the 2016 proposal to elect Matthew Levatich to the board of
directors at Harley-Davidson in 2016. Nearly one-fifth of the index funds that voted
on this proposal were members of families that did not hold Harley-Davidson in its
active funds, and their votes are coded as Family Does Not Hold Actively = 1. Ap-
proximately 80% of the index funds voting on this proposal held Harley-Davidson in
their actively managed funds, coded as Family Does Not Hold Actively = 0. This vari-
ation of Family Does Not Hold Actively at the proposal level allows me to incorporate
proposal fixed effects. Such fixed effects look within the proposal, controlling for the
effects that proposal quality, proxy advisor recommendations, and other unobservable
proposal characteristics might have on the fund’s decision to oppose management. All
these features of the proposal are the same for every investor voting on that proposal
and are absorbed by this fixed effect.
In addition to showing that index funds engage in governance through proxy
voting, I consider whether their monitoring activities have consequences. I begin by
showing that index fund opposition to a proposal has an incremental effect on whether
that proposal passes: a lack of index fund support increases the likelihood a company
proposal fails. To control for the mechanical relationship between the probability of
failure and lack of direct support by index fund voters, I use the difference in index
fund and active fund opposition on a proposal in my regression specifications. As
the difference between index fund and active fund opposition widens, the proposal
becomes more likely to fail. Additionally, I document positive risk-adjusted returns at
firms when proposals supported by index funds pass. These results together provide
evidence that investors value the monitoring behaviors of these funds and find their
decisions to be informative regarding the prospects of the firm.
To the best of my knowledge, I am the first to identify and isolate the monitor-
ing behavior of index funds, net of influence of active funds, by focusing on Family
Does Not Hold Actively shares. Appel et al. (2016, 2019) and Heath, Macciocchi,
Michaely, and Ringgenberg (2018) have exploited the variation in institutional own-
ership following the Russell 1000/2000 reconstruction to draw conflicting conclusions
4
regarding the effects of indexed ownership on governance.6 My results are consis-
tent with Appel et al. (2016), who find that index ownership at a firm is associated
with more independent directors, removal of takeover defenses, and more equal voting
rights. Additionally, in Appel et al. (2019) the authors identify that an increase in
index ownership is associated with an increased use of proxy fights by activists and a
higher likelihood that an activist obtains representation on the board of their target
firm. Yet, Heath et al. (2018) argue that the rise of index investing shifts power
from investors to firm managers as index funds do not engage in voting governance
as much as actively managed funds do. In my paper, I cleanly and directly identify
that index funds on average do vote their shares against management and are more
likely to do so on Family Does Not Hold Actively shares than Family Holds in Index
& Active shares.
This paper also contributes to a literature examining the determinants of proxy
voting decisions by institutions. Firm characteristics (Cai, Garner, and Walkling,
2009), fund characteristics (Dimmock et al., 2018b; Iliev and Lowry, 2015) and the
relationship between the institution and firm (Cvijanović, Dasgupta, and Zachari-
adis, 2016; Davis and Kim, 2007) have all been tied to how an institutional investor
votes on an issue, with positive past performance, higher net benefits of voting, and
business ties between the institution and firm increasing the level of support among
institutional shareholders. In this study, I show that an additional institution-firm
characteristic, whether a share is held only by index funds within a family, is an
additional determinant of the voting decision.
Finally, this paper contributes to the literature on the effects of institutional
governance. Gillan and Starks (2000) show that shareholder proposals sponsored by
institutions are significantly more likely to pass, while Morgan, Poulsen, Wolf, and
Yang (2011) find that high mutual fund approval rates substantially increase the
probability that a proposal passes. Other papers explore the effects of governance on
shareholder value. Cuñat et al. (2012) uncover positive risk-adjusted returns when
shareholder proposals pass by a small margin at firms with concentrated ownership
and high preexisting antitakeover provisions. Similarly, Iliev and Lowry (2015) show
that the market positively reacts following the passage of a proposal supported by
funds that actively engage in monitoring. In this paper, I additionally show that
index fund support has an incremental effect on whether a proposal at a company
shareholder meeting passes, and that investors respond positively to the passage of
proposals that index funds support.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I discuss the re-
search setting, explain why shareholder voting is a particularly useful area for exam-
ining governance activities, and provide an overview of the sample. Section 3 presents
the main univariate and multivariate results, demonstrating that index funds are more
likely to oppose management on Family Does Not Hold Actively shares than Family
Holds in Index & Active shares. I demonstrate the effects of index fund governance
on failure rates of proposals and firm value in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
6Heath, Heath et al. (2018) use a modified approach of the Russell reconstruction, exploiting
two new discontinuities around the Russell index cutoff that is described in full detail in their paper.
5
1.2 Research Setting and Data
1.2.1 Proxy voting as a research setting
Proxy voting records are a useful setting for examining monitoring activities of insti-
tutional investors for several reasons, in part due to the legal framework governing
fund voting. The SEC adopted Rules 206(4)-6 and 30b1-4 to regulate proxy voting
in part because “voting power gives advisers significant ability collectively, and in
many cases individually, to affect the outcome of shareholder votes and influence the
governance of corporations. Advisers are thus in a position to significantly affect the
future of corporations and, as a result, the future value of corporate securities held
by their clients.”7 By SEC Rule 206(4)-6, investment advisers and funds owe a “duty
of care” that “requires an adviser with proxy voting authority to monitor corporate
events and to vote the proxies.”8 This rule implies that institutional investors must
vote their proxies, and any fund abstaining or withholding support on a proposal
effectively votes against that proposal by submitting a “abstain” or “withhold” vote.
In addition, SEC Rule 30b1-4 requires that institutional investors and fund advisors
make public their complete proxy voting record each year on an SEC filing, the Form
N-PX, that reveals their actual governance behavior and preferences.9 Crucially,
these rules regarding fiduciary duty, voting requirements, and disclosure apply to all
registered funds under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, whether index funds or
active funds.
Further, there is substantial evidence in the literature that funds consider proxy
voting an important tool when monitoring their portfolio firms. In a survey of institu-
tional investors, McCahery et al. (2016) reveal that funds frequently rely on voice as
a disciplinary mechanism, particularly among long-term institutional investors. Ag-
garwal, Erel, and Starks (2014) present evidence that funds appear to largely adhere
to Rule 206(4)-6 by uncovering a strong relationship between institutional voting and
shareholder preferences. Dimmock et al. (2018b) show that funds with a tax-sensitive
clientele frequently rely on “voice” through voting rather than “exit” because selling
out of a position would yield a tax liability if there were an accrued capital gain.
Finally, proxy voting decisions by institutional investors yield changes at portfolio
firms and in financial markets. Matvos and Ostrovsky (2010) find that systematic
voting differences among institutional investors and peer effects in fund voting be-
havior are as important as firm and director characteristics in shaping vote outcomes.
Iliev and Lowry (2015) show that the market positively reacts following the passage
of a proposal supported by funds that actively engage in monitoring, while Morgan
et al. (2011) indicate that higher levels of mutual fund support increases the likelihood
that a proposal passes.
7SEC Release No. IA-2106; File No. S7-38-02. See https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/ia-
2106.htm.
8Final Rule: Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers. See https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/ia-
2106.htm.
9Final Rule: Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Man-
agement Investment Companies. See https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8188.htm.
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1.2.2 ISS Voting Analytics Database
I use the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) Voting Analytics database to obtain
fund proxy voting records. This database includes the information that funds furnish
to the SEC on the required Form N-PX: the name and issuer of a portfolio security,
the shareholder meeting date, a brief description of the matter voted on, whether
the matter was proposed by either firm management or a shareholder, and how the
registrant cast their vote. Institutions must file this form by the end of each August,
covering all the votes they have submitted in the previous N-PX reporting year, from
July 1st through June 30th.
In addition to the data included in the N-PX filings, ISS’s Voting Analytics
database includes ISS’s vote recommendation for all proposals at Russell 3000 firms
and the outcome of the proposal (i.e., whether it passed or failed). These recom-
mendations are provided to each of ISS’s institutional clients prior to an election
and are used to inform the fund’s voting decision. Following a voluminous literature
that documents the importance of ISS recommendations to institutional investors,
shareholders, and proposal outcomes, I use ISS’s recommendation to identify pro-
posals with value implications.10 Proposals where ISS disagrees with management
and recommends a vote against management’s recommendation are referred to as
contentious proposals in this study.
An observation in the ISS Voting Analytics database therefore consists of the name
of the fund family or institution, the name of the fund, a unique proposal identifier,
a description of the proposal up for a vote, the firm management’s recommendation,
the proposal sponsor, how the fund voted, ISS’s recommendation, and the outcome of
the vote. Each observation consists of the fund’s voting “opinion” for that proposal,
not the number of votes the fund submits on a proposal based on the number of
shares it holds of the company. For example, one observation in my data shows that
Vanguard’s 500 Index Fund (VFINX) voted its shares in favor of Robert A. Iger of the
Walt Disney Company to retain his position as a member of the Board of Directors on
March 3, 2016. Further, this proposal was sponsored by the issuer (The Walt Disney
Company), Disney management recommended a vote in favor of this proposal, and
this proposal passed. This was not a contentious proposal, as ISS recommended that
investors vote in favor of management’s candidate. Additional observations show that
the Vanguard U.S. Growth Fund and the Fidelity Contrafund also voted their shares
of Disney in favor of this proposal.
10ISS is the largest of only five proxy advisory firms in the United States, with an estimated 61%
market share (Copland, Larcker, and Tayan, 2018; Glassman and Peirce, 2014). Numerous studies
document that ISS recommendations are economically meaningful, that ISS support increases the
probability a proposal passes, and that the passage of a proposal with ISS support is associated
with positive risk-adjusted returns (Bethel and Gillan, 2002; Morgan, Poulsen, and Wolf, 2006; Cai
et al., 2009; Alexander, Chen, Seppi, and Spatt, 2010; Cotter, Palmiter, and Thomas, 2010; Morgan
et al., 2011; Iliev and Lowry, 2015; Malenko and Shen, 2016; Dimmock et al., 2018b).
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1.2.3 Sample and Descriptive Statistics
The ISS Voting Analytics database does not identify index funds. Following Appel
et al. (2016), I identify index funds based on fund names, using a similar set of
keywords and strings and manually checking for false positives.11 Additionally, I keep
only binding management sponsored proposals and exclude all advisory shareholder
sponsored proposals. As in Del Guercio, Seery, and Woidtke (2008), Dimmock et al.
(2018b), and Fischer, Gramlich, Miller, and White (2009), I consider all votes where
a fund votes “against”, “withhold”, or “abstain” as a vote against management. I
obtain fund and institution characteristics from the CRSP Survivor-Bias Free US
Mutual Fund Database and firm characteristics from Compustat.12
I manually sort proposals into broad categories to use in conjunction with ISS’s
recommendation to control for proposal quality. All management sponsored propos-
als to elect executives to the corporate board make up the Director Elections category
(72.8% of the proposals). Compensation proposals include items where shareholders
vote to approve executive pay, such as incentive bonus plans and stock option plans.
Accounting proposals consist of items regarding financial statements, including ratify-
ing the external auditor and approving financial statements. Board proposals consist
of all proposal relating to the board, but exclude the recurring annual director elec-
tions (i.e., approve change in the size of the board, fix the number of directors, and
elect supervisory board members.) Payout proposals include items pertaining to the
allocation of dividends and authorization of share repurchase programs. Finally, Gen-
eral proposals are all other general business items, such as approving reverse stock
splits and calling for the adjournment of the annual meeting.
Summary statistics for the final matched sample are presented in Table 1.2. The
sample consists of 654 index funds voting on 267,847 management-sponsored pro-
posals at 5,155 firms for a total of 8.8 million fund-proposal observations. The data
covers N-PX reporting years 2006-2016.13 All variables are described in Appendix A.
The main variable of interest, Family Does Not Hold Actively, has an average of 0.27.
That is, index funds in the sample are submitting votes on proposals at companies
their family does not hold in its active funds 27% of the time.
11The set of strings used are INDEX, IDX, INDX, IND , RUSSELL, S & P, S&P, S AND P, SP ,
DOW , MSCI, BLOOMBERG, KBW, NASDAQ, NYSE, FTSE, WILSHIRE, MORNINGSTAR,
STOXX, 100, 400, 500, 600, 900, 1000, 1500, 2000, 3000, 5000, where “ ” indicates a space.
12In univariate tests, I consider the full record of index fund votes in the ISS Voting Analytics
database. Multivariate regressions use only the matched sample ISS-CRSP sample. Because there
is no unique identifier that maps from the CRSP to ISS databases, I first match manually on
institutional family name then programmatically on fund name. The matched sample’s index TNA
was $2.18 trillion for the N-PX year ending in 2016. The ICI Investment Company Factbook reported
2016 year-end index fund TNA of $2.62 trillion. My matched sample therefore covers an estimated
2.18 / 2.62 = 83% of the market.
13Although the ISS Voting Analytics data begins in 2003, years prior to 2006 have limited coverage
and are not included in this study.
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1.3 Index Funds and Engagement in Governance
1.3.1 Univariate Tests
To provide context on the levels at which index funds engage in governance of their
portfolio firms, I compare their proxy voting behaviors to that of actively managed
funds. There is ample evidence that institutional investors, in particular active funds,
influence management and monitor their portfolio firms through voting and voice
(Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales, 2013; Del Guercio and Hawkins, 1999; Gillan and
Starks, 2003; Iliev and Lowry, 2015; Matvos and Ostrovsky, 2010; McCahery et al.,
2016). I present the average rates of opposition for actively managed funds and index
funds on management sponsored proposals in Panel A of Table 1.3. Overall, funds
submit a vote against management 7.1% of the time (Column 1). Index funds and
active funds do not differ greatly in their average rates of opposition to management,
as the difference in their average rates of opposition is 0.3% (t-stat = 0.89). On
contentious proposals where ISS recommends a vote against management, the rate of
opposition is much higher: funds submit votes against management’s recommendation
54.5% on the time. Noticeably, index funds do not appear to strictly rely on the advice
of ISS as their votes align with this proxy advisor’s recommendation only half of the
time (Column 2). Active funds, on the other hand, appear more likely to align with
ISS as they vote against management 58.1% of the time when ISS recommends a vote
against management (Column 3). Index funds also are slightly more likely to vote
against management when ISS recommends a vote in favor of management’s proposal.
On non-contentious proposals, index funds vote against management 3.5% of the time
(Column 2), 0.5% more than actively managed funds, though this difference is not
statistically significant (t-stat = 1.41).
The average rate of opposition by index funds on contentious proposals (Table 1.2,
Panel A, Column 2) could imply that half of index fund votes follow management’s
recommendation, and that half of index fund votes follow ISS’s recommendation. A
fund, however, that always follows management’s recommendation or a fund that
always follows ISS’s recommendation should not be considered an engaged monitor.
Therefore, the 50.0% average rate of opposition by index funds on contentious pro-
posals cannot necessarily be interpreted as evidence of governance by index funds. To
address the possibility that index funds either always follow management or always
follow ISS, I compute each fund’s average rate of opposition on contentious proposals
during that fund’s life in the sample. Then, I sort the funds into 12 bins (10 deciles
and 2 overflow bins) based on how frequently that fund voted against management.
A graph of this distribution is presented in Figure 1.3. The two left-most vertical
bars indicate that approximately 4.8% of active funds and 5.0% of index funds in the
sample always vote with management on contentious proposals. These funds have
an average rate of opposition of 0% on the horizontal axis. The two right-most ver-
tical bars show that approximately 13.3% of active funds and 8.9% of index funds
always vote with ISS on contentious proposals, as these funds have an average rate
of opposition of 100% on the horizontal axis. Thus, a vast majority of index funds
fall somewhere between these opposite extremes: 16% of index funds in the sample
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oppose management between 30 and 40% of the time on contentious proposals (the
highest dark vertical bar), and a majority (nearly 54% of index funds in the sample)
oppose management between 20 and 60% of the time. Thus, index funds do not
always align with management or always align with ISS.
The results presented in Panel A of Table 1.3 and Figure 1.3 show that index funds
and active funds in general do not meaningfully differ in their average rates of voting
opposition to management overall, and index funds are slightly less likely to submit
a vote that agrees with ISS’s recommendation than active funds. Noticeably, active
funds are substantially more likely than index funds to vote in the same way as ISS
recommends on contentious proposals, though I make no claim that this relationship
is causal. This preliminary evidence, however, dispels the concern that index funds,
at least in the aggregate, completely disregard voting responsibilities by either always
siding with management or always siding with ISS.
There remains the possibility that index funds vote largely the same as active
funds due to overlapping holdings. For example, a number of S&P 500 member firms
are present both in the Vanguard 500 Index Fund (VFIAX) and Vanguard’s actively
managed Capital Value Fund (VCVLX). When the VFIAX index fund manager sub-
mits a vote against management, it could be doing so at the behest of the active
fund VCVLX whose managers seek to take advantage of the index fund’s large voting
power at a firm. I address this possibility by comparing the two types of shares held
within an index fund: Family Holds in Active & Index shares and Family Does Not
Hold Actively shares. Panel B of Table 1.3 presents these results. Here, the sample
consists of index funds alone. The average rates of opposition presented in Column 1
of Panel B repeat the summary statistics from Column 3 of Panel A. Index funds on
average oppose management 7.3% of the time overall and 50.0% of the time on con-
tentious proposals. Columns 2 and 3 separately show the average rates of opposition
by index funds on shares that only they, and not actively managed funds within their
family, hold as well as the average rates of opposition by index funds on shares that
both they and active funds within their family concurrently hold. Index funds oppose
management more frequently on Family Does Not Hold Actively shares (10.0%) than
they do on Family Holds in Active & Index shares (6.0%), and this difference is sta-
tistically significant (t-stat = 4.82, Column 4). Thus, index funds appear to be more
aggressive when voting on shares that are only held in index funds by their families
than on shares that are held in active funds by their family. Of note, the average
rate of opposition by index funds is higher for Family Does Not Hold Actively shares
than Family Holds in Active & Index shares on non-contentious proposals (t-stat of
difference = 2.52, Column 4); therefore, index funds do not appear to blindly follow
ISS’s recommendation when voting on shares their families do not hold in their active
funds. Panel C of Table 3 shows this positive and significant difference between av-
erage rates of opposition on Family Does Not Hold Actively shares and Family Holds
in Active & Index shares generally holds across a broad range of proposal categories.
Therefore, index funds do not appear to concentrate all their governance efforts on
one type of proposal category.
For a given proposal, the measure Family Does Not Hold Actively can vary. Re-
calling the hypothetical institutional fund family in Figure 1.2, stock BAC is classified
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as a Family Does Not Hold Actively share, or Family Does Not Hold Actively = 1 for
this stock in this institutional family. This same stock at the same point in time may
also be classified as Family Does Not Hold Actively = 0 for another institutional fund
family if the share is held by both active and index funds or only by active funds
within that family. Therefore, for a given proposal, I compute the average Family
Does Not Hold Actively value, which ranges from 0 and 1. I then sort proposals into
quintiles based on their average value of Family Does Not Hold Actively. Proposals
with the highest average value of Family Does Not Hold Actively are in the fifth quin-
tile and are mostly held by index funds alone within families. Proposals with the
lowest average value of Family Does Not Hold Actively are in the first quintile and
are most held by both active and index funds by institutions. Within each of these
quintiles, I then compute the average rate of opposition by index funds.
These results are presented in Table 1.4. From the full sample results in Panel A,
the average difference in the average rate of opposition by index funds on proposals
in the fifth and first quintile of the Family Does Not Hold Actively distribution is a
statistically significant 8.34%. That is, the average rate of opposition by index funds
on shares that are largely held only by index funds is significantly higher than on
shares that are largely held both by active and index funds. Further, the average rate
of opposition monotonically increases from the first to the fifth quintile. The positive
and significant difference between the average rate of opposition on proposals in the
fifth and first quintiles is statistically significant for all proposals categories except
accounting proposals. In Panels B and C of Table 1.4, I split the sample to show
this relationship for both contentious and non-contentious proposals. The positive
and significant difference between the highest and lowest quintile generally holds:
regardless of the recommendation of ISS, index funds have substantially higher rates
of opposition on shares that are largely held only by index funds across institutional
fund families than on shares that are frequently held by both active and index funds.
The summary statistics discussed in this subsection indicate that index funds, on
average, monitor by voting proxy shares at least as much as active funds. Further,
index funds appear to exert even greater effort on monitoring portfolio firms that
their institutional family does not hold in its active funds. However, these averages
do not control for the endogenous choice by institutions to select certain firms to hold
in their active funds. That is, active funds may choose to avoid holding certain firms
that are members of an index because they perform poorly or are not well governed.
One might therefore expect greater levels of monitoring, and therefore higher rates
of opposition to management, by index funds that are required to hold these shares
that active funds within their family can choose to avoid. In the next subsection,
I address this possibility by including a number of firm, fund, family, and proposal
controls as well as various fixed effects.
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1.3.2 Multivariate Results
1.3.2.1 Index Fund Ownership and Opposition to Management
To better identify whether index funds are active monitors, I examine the relationship
between an index fund’s choice to vote against management and a portfolio firm’s
characteristics in a multivariate setting. Specifically, I estimate the following linear
probability model:
Pr(Oppose Managementf,c,p,t) =
β(Family Does Not Hold Actively)f,c,t + γX + τt + εf,c,p,t (1.1)
The dependent variable is equal to 1 if index fund f opposes management at company
c on proposal p in year N-PX reporting year t. The main independent variable of
interest, Family Does Not Hold Actively, is equal to 1 if the index fund’s family does
not hold company c in any of its actively managed funds at time t. Family Does
Not Hold Actively takes the value of 0 if both index funds and active funds within
the family vote on the proposal. X is vector of company, proposal, fund, and family
controls, as summarized in Table 1.2 and defined in Appendix A. τt represents N-PX
reporting year fixed effects.
The results of this regression are presented in Table 1.5. For legibility, the de-
pendent variable has been multiplied by 100. Consistent with the main findings of
the univariate results, an index fund is 1.3% more likely to oppose management of
a firm if that firm is not held by any of its actively managed funds (the coefficient
on Family Does Not Hold Actively from Column 1, statistically significant at the 1%
level.) This finding is robust to the inclusion of firm characteristics (market value,
book assets, return on assets, book to market ratio, leverage, excess return) as well
as fund and family characteristics (total net assets, age, number of funds). On con-
tentious proposals, where ISS recommends a vote against management, index funds
are 8.4% more likely to vote against management if the family does not hold the
firm’s shares in active funds (Column 2). This does not necessarily imply that index
funds are more likely to passively following ISS’s recommendations on these shares:
index funds are also 0.69% more likely to oppose management on Family Does Not
Hold Actively shares on non-contentious proposals (Column 3). Looking to the con-
trol variables in the full specification of Column 1, index funds are more likely to
oppose management at smaller firms by book assets and firms with lower profitabil-
ity as measure by ROA. Perhaps surprisingly, index funds are more likely to oppose
management with positive past excess return, though this result is consistent with a
finding in Morgen, Poulsen, Wolf, and Yang (2011).
1.3.2.2 Controlling for Firm Quality: Firm Fixed Effects
Within a firm, there is variation in the Family Does Not Hold Actively measure: some
index funds voting at a firm’s shareholder meeting belong to families whose active
funds simultaneously hold shares of that firm. Other index funds voting on proposals
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at that same firm belong to families that do not hold shares of that firm in their active
funds. This variation allows me to incorporate firm fixed effects in my analysis. The
regression specification becomes:
Pr(Oppose Managementf,c,p,t) =
β(Family Does Not Hold Actively)f,c,t + γX + τt + ζc + εf,c,p,t (1.2)
where ζc is the firm fixed effect. This fixed effect eliminates the impact that any
time-invariant firm-specific characteristics might have in informing a fund’s voting
decision. I thus identify the effect of Family Does Not Hold Actively on a fund’s
decision to oppose management by exploiting the differences across funds in whether
their family holds a firm actively, for the same company at the same point in time.
Alternatively, I substitute τt + ζc with ζc,t to include a firm-year fixed effect that
controls for any time-invariant characteristics of the firm within an N-PX reporting
year that might influence a fund’s vote.
Table 1.6 presents the results of Equation (1.2). Columns 1 through 3 include
the year and firm fixed effects while Columns 4 through 6 substitutes τt + ζc with
a firm-year fixed effect ζc,t. The same set of controls from Table 1.5 are included,
but suppressed for brevity.14 Reaffirming the findings of Table 1.5, Table 1.6 shows
that index funds are more likely to oppose management when active funds within
their family do not hold shares of the firms they are voting on. This is indicated by
the positive and statistically significant coefficient on Family Does Not Hold Actively
coefficient across all columns. Because index funds are more likely to oppose man-
agement on Family Does Not Hold Actively shares on non-contentious proposals, it
cannot be claimed that index funds blindly follow the recommendations of ISS.
1.3.2.3 Controlling for Proposal Quality: Proposal Fixed Effects
Family Does Not Hold Actively varies also within a proposal. Some index funds voting
on a given proposal belong to families whose active funds simultaneously vote on that
proposal while other index funds belong to families that only have index funds voting
on that proposal. This variation allows me to incorporate proposal fixed effects. The
regression specification is:
Pr(Oppose Managementf,c,p,t) =
β(Family Does Not Hold Actively)f,c,t + γX + δp + εf,c,p,t (1.3)
where δp represents proposal fixed effects. These fixed effects control for the effect
that firm or proposal characteristics, including ISS’s recommendation and perceived
proposal quality, has on the fund’s choice to vote against management. I therefore
identify the effect of Family Does Not Hold Actively on a fund’s decision to oppose
14Firm controls are not absorbed in this specification because they vary quarterly within the firm.
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management by exploiting the differences across funds in whether their family holds
a share in their active funds, for the same share at the same point in time.
Table 1.7 shows the results of Equation (1.3). By incorporating the proposal
fixed effects, all proposal and firm controls are absorbed because they do not vary
within a proposal. Similarly, ISS’s recommendation does not vary within a proposal,
so the independent variable Contentious is absorbed. An index fund is 1.3% more
likely to oppose management overall if the firm it is voting on is not held by ac-
tive funds within its family (Column 1). Splitting proposals into contentious and
non-contentious proposals reveals that the positive and significant relationship holds
across both subsamples of proposals (Columns 2 and 3). Therefore, the results are
robust to the inclusion of these highly stringent proposal fixed effects, mitigating the
concern that some omitted variable pertaining to the quality of firm or quality of
proposal drives the main results in Table 5.
The collective results of Tables 1.5, 1.6 and 1.7 in conjunction with the univariate
findings in the previous subsection present evidence that index funds do engage in
active voting governance. I indicate that index funds are more likely to vote against
management on shares their family holds only in index funds relative to shares their
families also holds in its active funds. By including year, firm, and proposal fixed
effects, as well a host of other controls, I rule out numerous other reasons that might
explain the higher propensity by index funds to oppose management on Family Does
Not Hold Actively shares. These fixed effects allow me to conclude that year trends,
firm quality, and proposal quality are not driving the higher level of opposition by
index funds.
1.4 The Effects of Index Fund Governance
1.4.1 Election Outcomes
In this section, I explore the effects of index fund opposition on proposal outcomes
and firm value. First, I test whether index fund opposition to a proposal increases
the likelihood that a proposal fails. To overcome the mechanical relationship between
the number of votes submitted against a proposal and the probability that the vote
fails, I follow Morgan et al. (2011) and consider the difference between index and
active opposition. Specifically, I estimate a linear probability model that relates an
indicator variable Fail set to 1 if the proposal fails and zero otherwise (multiplied by
100) to the difference of index and active fund opposition:
Pr(Failp,c,t) = β1(Index Oppose % − Active Oppose%)p,c,t
+ β2(Active Oppose %) + γX + τt + ζc + εp,c,t (1.4)
The unit of observation is a proposal p at firm c in N-PX reporting year t. Index
Oppose % - Active Oppose % is the difference in opposition rates of index and active
funds voting on proposal p at firm c at time t. The index (active) fund opposition
rate is calculated as the number of votes submitted by index (active) funds against
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management on a company proposal divided by the total number of votes submitted
by index (active) funds on that proposal. Following Morgan et al. (2011), I include a
vector of the proposal categories, X, as defined in the previous section to control for
the quality of the proposal. τt and ζc are year and firm fixed effects, respectively.
Panel A of Table 1.8 presents the descriptive statistics for the dependent and
independent variables of Equation (1.4). The sample includes ten years of voting data,
from 2006 to 2016, across 276,979 proposals and 5,326 firms. Only 1% of management
sponsored proposals in the sample fail overall, though 6% of contentious management
sponsored proposals fail. The median rate of opposition by index (active) funds is
approximately 2% (1%), and the average of the difference between the levels of index
fund and active fund opposition is approximately -1
Panel B of Table 1.8 presents these results of Equation (1.4). All columns include
year fixed effects, while Columns 3 and 4 include company or firm fixed effects.
Across all specifications, there is a positive and significant relationship between the
probability a proposal fails and the difference between index fund and active fund
opposition. As the rate at which index funds oppose a proposal increases relative to
the rate at which active funds oppose a proposal, the probability that the proposal
fails increases. The results in Columns 3 and 4 control for omitted and time-invariant
characteristics associated with the company that the funds are voting on, including
the firm’s performance or governance qualities. Thus, after controlling for the voting
behavior of actively managed funds, proposal quality, and company characteristics,
index fund opposition to a proposal has a statistically significant effect on whether
a proposal fails. These real effects of governance activism by index funds perhaps
incentivize them to devote resources to monitoring in the first place.
1.4.2 Implications for Shareholder Value
In the previous sections, I demonstrated that index funds engage in governance and
that their voting behavior has an incremental effect on whether a proposal passes.
But do investors value this engagement in monitoring? To test this, I follow the
methodology employed in Iliev and Lowry (2015) and regress abnormal returns the
day of a company’s election on the level of support by index funds. Positive risk-
adjusted returns around the passage of a proposal that index funds support would
indicate that the market finds value in their voting opinion and governance activi-
ties. Alternatively, if index funds support a proposal that ultimately fails, negative
abnormal returns would indicate that the market perceives such a proposal passing
to be value reducing. Similar to Cuñat et al. (2012) and Iliev and Lowry (2015), I
consider only close votes to concentrate the analysis on those proposals where the
probability of passing is less likely to be accurately predicted and factored into stock
returns. The regression specification is therefore:
αc,t = β1(Pass× Index%For)p + β2(Index%For)p + β3(Pass)p
+ β4(Pass× ISSFor)p + β5(Overall%For)p+
β6(Pass×Overall%For)p + εc,t (1.5)
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αc,t is the Fama-French four factor alpha for company c on election day t, estimated
using the CRSP value-weighted market index. The alpha estimation period is 255
trading days, ending 46 trading days before the event date. Passp is equal to 1 if
proposal p passes and 0 otherwise. Index(Overall)%Forp is the percentage of index
funds (all funds) that vote in favor of proposal v. Lastly, ISSForp is equal to 1 if ISS
supports proposal v and 0 otherwise. The sample is all proposals that have between
either 45 and 55% or 40 and 60% support by funds in the ISS Voting Analytics
database.
Panel A of Table 1.9 presents the summary statistics associated with the depen-
dent and independent variables of Equation (1.5). The risk-adjusted returns on the
day of a company election are 0.01%, with a minimum of -1.57% and a maximum of
0.96%. The average level of support by index funds (all funds) is 49% (44%). These
“close” proposals are far less likely to pass than proposals in the overall sample: 89
The regression results of Equation (1.5) are presented in Panel B of Table 1.9.
Columns 1 and 2 show the results for the sample of proposals with between 45 and
55% support by index and active funds, while Columns 3 and 4 include all proposals
with between 40 and 60% support by index and active funds. The positive and
significant coefficient on Pass × Index%For in indicates that of the proposals that
passed, those that were favored most by index funds were more likely to be value
increasing. The coefficient in Column 1 (0.20) is similar in magnitude to that in
the analysis of Iliev and Lowry (2015) who examined the effects that engaged voters
among actively managed funds had on abnormal returns. Proposals that index funds
supported but failed to pass are associated with negative abnormal returns on the
day of the election, as indicated by the negative and statistically significant coefficient
on Index % For. These results are robust to the inclusion of ISS’s recommendation
and the overall support by institutional investors in Columns 2 and 4.
1.5 Conclusion
The rapid rise of index investing calls into question whether these funds monitor
the firms in their portfolio that they, by construction, are required to hold. To
determine if these funds are active monitors, I focus on shares that are only held
in index funds at the fund family level. I find that index funds are more aggressive
when voting their proxies on these Family Does Not Hold Actively shares than when
voting on Family Holds in Active & Index shares that are held in both the family’s
active and index funds. This identification strategy rules out the possibility that
index funds are primarily voting at the discretion of active fund managers within
their family. By considering separately contentious proposals and proposals across
different categories, I control for the quality of the item on the ballot as well as the
potential for the proposal to affect shareholder value. The incorporation of proposal-
level fixed effects rules out the possibility that other firm-specific characteristics, such
as the past performance of a given stock, profitability, leverage, or board structure,
are driving the results.
In addition to showing that index funds engage in governance through proxy
voting, I find that their voting behavior has an effect on the passage of a proposal
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and the underlying firm’s value. A lack of support by index funds significantly reduces
the likelihood a proposal passes. Additionally, investors value the governance choices
of index funds as a proposal passing with index fund support is associated with
positive abnormal returns around the company election.
My results contribute to the growing literature in the area of corporate governance
by institutional investors by being the first to identify index fund engagement in
governance, net of influence by actively managed funds. These results supplement the
Fisch et al. (2019) theory that index funds have an incentive to engage in corporate
governance to compete with active funds that have discretion over their holdings.
Lewellen and Lewellen (2018) introduce an additional motivation for index funds
to engage in governance by demonstrating that institutions increase their cash flow
through management fees when, through effective monitoring, they increase the value
of their portfolio shares.
Although the evidence presented in this paper indicates that index investors par-
ticipate in governance, it is important that researchers and regulators monitor the
influence of proxy advisors and large institutional investors into the future. Recent
actions undertaken by the Securities and Exchange Commission seek to address the
rise of institutional investing and its effects on corporate governance. In September
of 2018, the SEC rescinded two letters authored by its staff that suggested mutual
fund managers could satisfy their fiduciary duty to vote their shares by outsourcing
decisions to proxy advisors.15 This action limits the power that proxy advisory ser-
vices like ISS, Egan-Jones Rating Company, and Glass, Lewis & Co. exert over the
governance process. Additionally, the Chairman and Commissioners of the SEC in
November of 2018 hosted a roundtable discussion with academic, government, and in-
dustry panelists, with the goal of “review[ing] whether our existing rules are achieving
their objectives effectively in light of changes in our marketplace.” As index invest-
ing continues to grow and the regulatory environment changes, the relative impact
of index funds’ governance choices will become increasingly important, and the area
will remain ripe for research into their motivations for being engaged owners.
15The SEC’s discussion of these letters and their withdrawal are available at
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-regarding-staff-proxy-advisory-letters.
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Table 1.1: Rates of Voting Opposition by S&P 500 Index Funds
This table presents average rates of opposition for the largest twenty-five S&P 500
funds in the ISS Voting Analytics database based on their total net assets as re-
ported in the CRSP Mutual Fund database. The funds are ordered based on their
family’s size. Column 1 presents the fund’s average quarterly opposition rate on
management-sponsored proposals, calculated as the number of times the fund voted
against management divided by the total number of management-sponsored propos-
als the fund voted on within a quarter. A fund’s vote is how the fund voted on a
proposal across all its shares of the company. Column 2 presents each fund’s average
quarterly opposition rate on shares within the S&P 500 index that the fund’s family
concurrently holds in any of its actively managed funds. Column 3 presents each
fund’s average quarterly opposition rate on shares within the S&P 500 index that
the fund’s family does not concurrently hold in its any of its actively managed funds.
Column 4 presents the difference between Columns 3 and 2.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
S&P 500 Index Fund Overall Family Holds in
Index & Active
Family Does Not
Hold Actively
Difference
Vanguard 3.7% 3.6% 21.8% 18.2%
BlackRock 4.6% 4.5% 5.0% 0.6%
Fidelity 10.7% 10.7% 14.0% 3.3%
State Street 7.1% 4.7% 9.0% 4.3%
T. Rowe Price 5.4% 5.0% 7.0% 2.0%
AIM/Invesco 5.9% 5.4% 6.6% 1.2%
DFA 8.9% 8.3% 23.5% 15.3%
J.P. Morgan 5.4% 5.2% 6.1% 0.8%
Charles Schwab 7.4% 7.2% 22.7% 15.5%
TIAA-CREF 2.9% 2.9% 7.2% 4.3%
Columbia 6.7% 6.7% 5.9% -0.8%
Principal 4.4% 4.4% 5.7% 1.3%
Legg Mason 5.6% 5.1% 6.3% 1.2%
Prudential 6.0% 5.8% 6.6% 0.7%
American Century 8.4% 7.5% 11.3% 3.8%
SEI Investments 5.3% 5.3% 10.1% 4.8%
Wells Fargo 4.3% 4.3% 5.1% 0.8%
BNY Mellon 6.1% 5.7% 7.2% 1.5%
Northern Trust 2.3% 2.2% 2.7% 0.5%
Federated 7.5% 8.0% 7.0% -1.0%
NYL MainStay 5.6% 5.6% 6.1% 0.5%
Morgan Stanley 6.7% 6.3% 9.3% 3.0%
Deutsche 5.6% 5.1% 6.8% 1.8%
Victory 4.6% 4.6% 5.3% 0.8%
UBS 5.8% 3.8% 6.6% 2.8%
Average 5.9% 5.5% 9.0% 3.5%
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics
This table presents summary statistics for the proxy proposals, firms, and funds in the
merged ISS Voting Analytics and CRSP Survivor-Bias Free Mutual Fund database.
Firm characteristics for the portfolio firms come from Compustat. The final matched
sample covers 654 index funds voting on 267,847 management-sponsored proposals at
5,155 firms for 11 Form N-PX voting years beginning July 1, 2006 and ending June
30, 2016. All variables are described in Appendix A. The unit of observation is a
fund-proposal pair.
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N Median Mean S.D. P5 P25 P75 P95
Family Does Not Hold Actively 8,797,576 0 0.27 0.44 0 0 1 1
Contentious 8,797,576 0 0.08 0.27 0 0 0 1
Firm Characteristics
Ln(Market Value) 7,840,136 8.1 8.16 1.8 5.4 6.8 9.4 11.2
Ln(Book Assets) 7,888,231 8.35 8.39 1.9 5.3 7.1 9.7 11.7
ROA 7,880,799 0.01 0.01 0.04 -0.03 0 0.02 0.04
Book to Market 6,828,001 0.47 0.73 28 0.1 0.3 0.8 1.4
Leverage 7,772,509 0.21 0.75 40.5 0 0.1 0.5 1.7
Excess Return 8,266,259 0.01 0.02 0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.3
Proposal Categories
Accounting Proposal 8,566,075 0 0.11 0.31 0 0 0 1
Board Proposal 8,566,075 0 0.02 0.13 0 0 0 0
Compensation Proposal 8,566,075 0 0.12 0.32 0 0 0 1
Director Election Proposal 8,566,075 1 0.73 0.44 0 0 1 1
Payout Proposal 8,566,075 0 0 0.03 0 0 0 0
General Proposal 8,566,075 0 0.03 0.16 0 0 0 0
Fund & Institution Characteristics
Ln(Family Size) 8,786,836 11.9 11.8 2.4 7.8 10.1 13.9 14.9
Ln(Fund Size) 8,731,348 6.7 6.7 2.5 2.5 5 8.5 10.7
S&P 500 Fund 8,797,576 0 0.1 0.3 0 0 0 1
Fund Age (years) 8,797,576 10 11 8.3 1.2 4.7 14.9 24.4
Family Age (years) 8,797,576 62.5 55.1 31.3 14.2 24 88.1 88.1
Number of Funds 8,797,576 106 117.8 91.8 13 48 132 324
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Table 1.3: Differences in Active and Index Fund Opposition to Management
This table presents average rates of opposition to management by index and active funds on proposals in the Institutional
Shareholder Services Voting Analytics Database by fund type and proposal type from 2006 to 2016. Panel A presents the
overall level of opposition by all funds, then compares the average rates of opposition by index funds to active funds on
contentious and non-contentious proposals. Panel B compares average rates of opposition by index funds on Family Does
Not Hold Actively shares and Family Holds in Index & Active shares for contentious and non-contentious proposals. Panel C
compares average rates of opposition by index funds on Family Does Not Hold Actively shares and Family Holds in Index &
Active shares for contentious and non-contentious proposals across proposal categories. Family Does Not Hold Actively shares
are shares that the index fund is voting on that no active fund within its fund family concurrently holds. Family Holds in Index
& Active shares are shares that the index fund is voting on that active funds within its family concurrently hold. Proposal
categories are defined in Appendix A. The opposition rates in columns (1) through (3) are calculated as the number of votes
submitted by funds in opposition to management’s recommendation divided by the total number of votes submitted by funds. A
fund’s vote is how the fund voted on a proposal across all its shares of the company. Column (4) presents the difference between
columns (2) and (3), as well as the t-statistic and statistical significance of that difference. Standard errors are clustered at the
fund level. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
Panel A: Active Fund and Index Fund Voting
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Overall Oppose Index Fund Oppose Active Fund Oppose Difference t-stat
All Proposals 7.10% 7.30% 6.90% 0.30% 0.89
Contentious 54.50% 50.00% 58.10% -8.10% -4.31***
Non-contentious 3.30% 3.50% 3.10% 0.50% 1.41
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Panel B: Index Fund Voting by Share Type
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Index Fund Oppose Family Does Not Hold Actively Family Holds in Index & Active Difference t-stat
All Proposals 7.30% 10.00% 6.00% 3.90% 4.82***
Contentious 50.00% 53.60% 47.50% 6.00% 3.37***
Non-contentious 3.50% 4.90% 2.90% 2.00% 2.52**
Panel C: Index Fund Voting by Type of Share across Proposal Categories
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Index Fund Oppose Family Does Not Hold Actively Family Holds in Index & Active Difference t-stat
Director Elections 6.40% 9.20% 5.20% 4.00% 4.05***
Contentious 45.50% 47.90% 43.70% 4.30% 2.23**
Non-contentious 3.30% 4.90% 2.60% 2.30% 2.29**
Compensation 14.30% 18.50% 12.40% 6.10% 7.95***
Contentious 55.50% 61.90% 51.70% 10.20% 4.98***
Non-contentious 6.80% 8.60% 6.00% 2.60% 3.81***
Accounting 1.10% 1.30% 0.90% 0.40% 2.86***
Contentious 59.40% 68.30% 55.80% 12.50% 4.05***
Non-contentious 0.70% 0.90% 0.50% 0.40% 3.10***
General 19.90% 24.40% 17.30% 7.10% 14.94***
Contentious 70.10% 77.60% 64.60% 12.90% 7.53***
Non-contentious 7.80% 8.80% 7.30% 1.50% 0.6
Board 9.80% 12.10% 8.90% 3.20% 6.14***
Contentious 56.70% 65.40% 53.10% 12.30% 4.13***
Non-contentious 2.70% 3.50% 2.40% 1.20% 4.12***
Payout 6.60% 9.90% 5.80% 4.10% 4.12***
Contentious 56.10% 66.10% 52.00% 14.00% 3.52***
Non-contentious 2.20% 1.90% 2.20% -0.30% -0.55
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Table 1.4: Opposition Rates Across the Family Does Not Hold Actively Distribution
For each proposal-index fund pair in the full ISS Voting Analytics sample, a value of Family Does Not Hold Actively = 1 is
assigned if that index fund’s family does not hold that share in any of its active funds (and thus the shares of that company are
held by index funds alone within that family). A value of Family Does Not Hold Actively = 0 is assigned if that index fund’s
family concurrently holds that share in any of its active funds (and thus the shares of that company are thus held by both
index funds and active funds within that family). Proposals are sorted into quintiles based on their average value of Family
Does Not Hold Actively. Proposals in the 5th quintile have an average Family Does Not Hold Actively value nearer to 1 and
are more frequently held only by index funds within a family. Proposals in the 1st quintile have an average Family Does Not
Hold Actively value nearer to 0 and are more frequently held both by active funds and index funds within a family. This table
presents the average rate at which index funds oppose management for proposals in each of these quintiles. Panel A presents the
opposition rates for all management sponsored proposals while Panels B and C present the opposition rates for contentious and
non-contentious proposals, respectively. The Difference columns present the difference in opposition rates between the highest
(5th) and lowest (1st) quintiles of Family Does Not Hold Actively, as well as the t-statistic and statistical significance of that
difference. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
Panel A: All Management Sponsored Proposals
Quintiles of Family Does Not Hold Actively Difference
1 2 3 4 5 5th − 1st t-stat
Director Elections 4.50% 6.20% 7.90% 9.40% 12.90% 8.38%*** 72.86
Compensation 11.30% 9.80% 13.20% 15.70% 21.20% 9.98%*** 22.27
Accounting 1.00% 0.80% 0.90% 1.00% 1.10% 0.03% 0.24
General 14.10% 15.80% 22.20% 23.30% 28.30% 14.19%*** 13.72
Board 8.50% 6.30% 8.70% 10.90% 18.60% 10.10%*** 7.91
Payout 6.00% 2.80% 11.80% 9.80% 22.70% 16.74%*** 3.15
Overall 5.50% 7.10% 8.70% 10.30% 13.90% 8.34%*** 75.86
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Panel B: Contentious Proposals
Quintiles of Family Does Not Hold Actively Difference
1 2 3 4 5 5th − 1st t-stat
Director Elections 41.10% 45.40% 45.60% 47.20% 48.10% 7.03%*** 13.79
Compensation 50.90% 51.70% 54.80% 55.70% 62.50% 11.62%*** 9.51
Accounting 53.20% 48.00% 57.70% 62.20% 63.30% 10.12% 1.17
General 59.40% 65.10% 71.10% 72.10% 73.50% 14.02%*** 6.3
Board 53.80% 63.60% 58.40% 65.50% 66.30% 12.47%*** 3.24
Payout 42.80% 62.20% 75.30% 48.10% 52.50% 9.67% 0.41
Overall 46.70% 50.00% 50.60% 51.70% 53.90% 7.22%*** 15.63
Panel C: Non-Contentious Proposals
Quintiles of Family Does Not Hold Actively Difference
1 2 3 4 5 5th − 1st t-stat
Director Elections 2.80% 3.30% 4.00% 4.70% 5.90% 3.17%*** 48.48
Compensation 6.40% 4.90% 5.90% 7.40% 8.80% 2.41%*** 8.72
Accounting 0.70% 0.70% 0.70% 0.70% 0.70% 0.00% -0.19
General 7.20% 7.60% 8.20% 9.50% 9.90% 2.69%*** 4.71
Board 1.80% 1.50% 2.80% 2.70% 7.30% 5.42%*** 7.46
Payout 4.40% 1.80% 1.90% 1.90% 6.30% 1.87% 0.64
Overall 3.00% 3.60% 4.20% 4.80% 5.90% 2.89%*** 48.4
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Table 1.5: Index Fund Ownership and Opposition to Management
This table presents regression results relating a fund’s vote to proposal, firm, and fund
characteristics as defined in Equation (1.1) of the text. The dependent variable is
an indicator variable for a fund’s vote against management (multiplied by 100). The
unit of observation is a fund-proposal pair. A fund’s vote is how the fund voted on a
proposal across all its shares of the company. All variables are defined in Appendix
A. Column (1) presents the results for all proposals, column (2) presents the results
for contentious proposals where ISS recommends a vote against management, and
column (3) presents the results for non-contentious proposals where ISS agrees with
management’s recommendation. Standard errors, presented in parentheses under co-
efficient estimates, are clustered at the fund level. ***, **, and * represent statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
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(1) (2) (3)
All Proposals Contentious Non-contentious
Family Does Not Hold Actively 1.33*** 8.41*** 0.69**
(0.42) (3.16) (0.34)
Contentious 47.86***
(2.67)
Ln(Market Value) 0.01 -0.81 0.08
(0.10) (0.78) (0.10)
Ln(Book Assets) -0.13** -0.29 -0.13**
(0.05) (0.32) (0.05)
ROA -4.88*** 1.55 -5.39***
(0.90) (4.39) (0.93)
Book to Market -0.01 -0.09* 0.00
(0.00) (0.05) (0.0)
Leverage 0.00 0.06 -0.00
(0.00) (0.04) (0.00)
Excess Return 0.28** 0.66 0.25***
(0.11) (0.63) (0.08)
Ln(Family TNA) -0.76*** -5.50** -0.37**
(0.22) (2.26) (0.18)
Ln(Fund TNA) -0.10 -2.04* 0.03
(0.10) (1.16) (0.09)
S&P 500 Fund -0.62 9.81 -1.23**
(0.63) (6.02) (0.59)
Fund Age 0.03 0.30 0.01
(0.03) (0.23) (0.02)
Family Age 0.01 0.06 0.01
(0.01) (0.11) (0.01)
Number of Funds 0.02*** 0.15*** 0.01***
(0.0) (0.03) (0.0)
Proposal Category Controls Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,325,499 452,063 5,873,436
Adj. R-squared 0.291 0.086 0.011
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Table 1.6: Index Fund Ownership and Opposition to Management: Firm Fixed Effects
This table presents regression results relating a fund’s vote to proposal, firm, and
fund characteristics as defined in Equation (1.2) of the text. The dependent variable
is an indicator variable for a fund’s vote against management (multiplied by 100).
The unit of observation is a fund-proposal pair. A fund’s vote is how the fund
voted on a proposal across all its shares of the company. All variables are defined in
Appendix A. Columns 1 and 4 present the results for all proposals, Columns 2 and
5 present the results for contentious proposals where ISS recommends a vote against
management, and Columns 3 and 6 present the results for non-contentious proposals
where ISS agrees with management’s recommendation. Standard errors, presented in
parentheses under coefficient estimates, are clustered at the fund level. ***, **, and
* represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Proposals Contentious Non-contentious All Proposals Contentious Non-contentious
Family Does Not Hold Actively 1.26*** 8.05** 0.68* 1.31** 8.11** 0.72*
(0.48) (3.64) (0.37) (0.51) (3.88) (0.40)
Contentious 46.46*** 46.62***
(2.72) (2.68)
Proposal Category Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes No No No
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes No No No
Firm × Year Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,325,497 452,040 5,873,430 6,325,499 452,060 5,873,436
Adj. R-squared 0.329 0.202 0.063 0.305 0.158 0.029
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Table 1.7: Index Fund Ownership and Opposition to Management: Proposal Fixed
Effects
This table presents regression results relating a fund’s vote to proposal, firm, and fund
characteristics as defined in Equation (1.3) of the text. The dependent variable is
an indicator variable for a fund’s vote against management (multiplied by 100). The
unit of observation is a fund-proposal pair. A fund’s vote is how the fund voted on a
proposal across all its shares of the company. All variables are defined in Appendix
A. Column 1 presents the results for all proposals, Column 2 presents the results
for contentious proposals where ISS recommends a vote against management, and
Column 3presents the results for non-contentious proposals where ISS agrees with
management’s recommendation. Standard errors, presented in parentheses under co-
efficient estimates, are clustered at the fund level. ***, **, and * represent statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
(1) (2) (3)
All Proposals Contentious Non-contentious
Family Does Not Hold Actively 1.31*** 8.12** 0.72*
(0.52) (3.91) (0.40)
Contentious Absorbed Yes No
Proposal Category Controls Absorbed Absorbed Absorbed
Firm Controls Absorbed Absorbed Absorbed
Fund Controls Yes Yes Yes
Family Controls Yes Yes Yes
Proposal Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,325,036 451,969 5,873,067
Adj. R-squared 0.398 0.234 0.152
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Table 1.8: The Effect of Index Opposition on Election Outcomes
This table presents regression results relating a proposal’s failure to index and active
fund voting opposition on contentious proposals. Panel A presents descriptive statis-
tics and Panel B presents the regression specification as defined in Equation (1.4)
of the text. The dependent variable is an indicator variable for a proposal failure
(multiplied by 100). The unit of observation is a company proposal. Index (Active)
Oppose % is calculated as the number of votes submitted by index (active) funds
in opposition to a proposal divided by the total number of votes submitted by in-
dex (active) funds on that proposal, where a fund’s vote is how the fund voted on
a proposal across all its shares of the company. Ind. Opp.% − Act. Opp.% is the
difference between Index Oppose % and Active Oppose %. All variables are defined
in Appendix A. Standard errors, presented in parentheses under coefficient estimates,
are clustered at the fund level. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Median Mean SD P5 P25 P75 P95
Fail 0 0.01 0.10 0 0 0 0
Contentious 0 0.11 0.31 0 0 0 1
Fail if Contentious 0 0.06 0.23 0 0 0 1
Index Oppose % 0.02 0.09 0.18 0 0 0.07 0.53
Active Oppose % 0.01 0.09 0.20 0 0 0.07 0.63
Ind. Opp.% − Act. Opp.% 0 -0.01 0.11 -0.17 -0.02 0.01 0.14
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Panel B: Proposal failure and differences in opinion
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cont. Non-cont. Cont. Non-cont.
Ind. Opp.% − Act. Opp.% 9.97*** 5.85*** 11.07*** 7.18***
(1.19) (0.58) (1.12) (0.44)
Active Oppose % 20.38*** 4.08*** 18.74*** 5.63****
(1.60) (0.63) (1.42) (0.48)
Ln(Market Value) 0.49** -0.04
(0.22) (0.03)
Ln(Book Assets) -0.13 0.06***
(0.19) (0.02)
ROA 0.04 -0.03
(3.31) (0.46)
Book to Market -0.00 -0.00
(0.05) (0.01)
Leverage 0.00 -0.00
(0.04) (0.00)
Excess Return -2.21*** 0.03
(0.63) (0.08)
Proposal Category Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Observations 15,535 151,506 24,722 234,416
Adj. R-squared 0.256 0.070 0.398 0.112
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Table 1.9: The Effect of Index Opposition on Abnormal Returns
This table presents regression results relating a company’s abnormal returns to index
and active fund voting support. The regression specification is defined in Equation
(1.5) of the text. Panel A presents summary statistics for the dependent and in-
dependent variables. Alpha is the Fama-French four-factor alphas on the day of a
shareholder election, in percent. Index (Overall) % For is the percentage of votes by
index funds (all funds) in favor of a proposal. Pass is an indicator equal to one if the
proposal passes. ISS For is an indicator equal to one if ISS supports the proposal.
Panel B presents the regression results. The dependent variable is the Fama-French
four-factor alpha on the day of the shareholder election, in decimal form. The sample
consists of “close votes” where proposals have between 45 and 55% support by funds
in Columns 1 and 2 and between 40 and 60% support in Columns 3 and 4. Standard
errors, presented in parentheses under coefficient estimates, are robust. ***, **, and
* represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Median Mean SD P5 P25 P75 P95
Alpha (percent) 0.01 0.01 0.17 -0.25 -0.07 0.09 0.28
Index % For 0.46 0.49 0.26 0.08 0.31 0.63 1
Pass 1 0.89 0.32 0 1 1 1
Overall % For 0.40 0.44 0.24 0.11 0.29 0.53 0.99
ISS % For 0 0.14 0.35 0 0 0 1
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Panel B: Abnormal returns around close votes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cont. Non-cont. Cont. Non-cont.
Pass × Index % For 0.20*** 0.51*** 0.09** 0.34***
(0.08) (0.13) (0.05) (0.08)
Index % For -0.20*** -0.39*** -0.11*** -0.29***
(0.07) (0.09) (0.04) (0.06)
Pass -0.08*** -0.06* -0.02 0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Pass × ISS For -0.05 -0.10**
(0.07) (0.04)
ISS For 0.02 0.02*
(0.02) (0.01)
Overall % For 0.27* 0.27***
(0.16) (0.09)
Pass × Overall % For -0.42** -0.38***
(0.18) (0.11)
Vote Level of Support Threshold 45 to 55 45 to 55 40 to 60 40 to 60
Observations 1,390 1,390 3,022 3,022
Adj. R-squared 0.011 0.015 0.004 0.007
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Figure 1.1: The Growth of Index Ownership
This figure presents U.S. equity mutual and exchange-traded fund assets under man-
agement as a percentage of total U.S. equity market capitalization from 2000 to
2018. The data on active fund and index fund total net assets is from the Invest-
ment Company Institute’s 2019 Investment Company Factbook. Total U.S. market
capitalization is sourced from World Bank.
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Figure 1.2: Overlapping Holdings and Family Does Not Hold Actively Shares
This figure presents a hypothetical institutional fund family consisting of two index
funds A and B and three actively managed funds X, Y, and Z. The unshaded circles
represent shares held only by active funds that are not held by index funds within
this fund family, or Family Holds Only in Active Funds shares. The hashed circles
represent shares that are held by both index and active funds within this fund family,
or Family Holds in Index & Active shares. The dark black circles are shares held only
by index funds within this fund family, or Family Does Not Hold Actively shares.
Family Does Not Hold Actively shares may be held by active funds in other fund
families or in multiple index funds within the same family.
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Figure 1.3: Distribution of Funds by their Overall Rate of Opposition to Management
This histogram presents the distribution of index funds and active funds based on
their overall level of opposition to management on contentious proposals. Contentious
proposals are those proposals where ISS recommends a vote against management. The
sample is all index and active funds in the ISS Voting Analytics database from 2006
to 2016. For each fund, I divide the number of times the fund voted in opposition
to a management proposal by the total number of times the fund submitted a vote
on a management proposal for its life in the sample. A fund’s vote is how the fund
voted on a proposal across all its shares of the company. A fund is then sorted into
deciles based on this average rate of opposition, as depicted on the horizontal axis.
The vertical axis presents the percentage of active funds (lighter vertical bars) and
the percentage of index funds (darker vertical bars) that fall into each decile.
Copyright c© Joseph Farizo, 2020.
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Chapter 2 Misconduct and Fraud by Investment Managers
2.1 Introduction
Fraud and misconduct by investment managers is an important and justified concern
for investors. During the period 2001-2016 the Security and Exchange Commission
(SEC) successfully prosecuted 981 cases of fraud committed by investment managers,
which collectively caused more than $40 billion in direct losses. In addition, these
frauds also cause indirect harm; Gurun, Stoffman, and Yonker (2018) show that fraud
by investment managers has significant spillover effects, resulting in reduced stock
market participation and investment even by those not directly victimized. Further,
this harm is not limited to a single category of investment manager. Zitzewitz (2006)
estimates that the mutual fund late trading scandal cost shareholders $400 million
per year from 1998 to 2003. Hedge funds, with their non-traditional holdings and less
regulatory scrutiny, have also suffered from fraud. Capco (2003) finds that nearly half
of hedge fund failures are due to fraud, mainly from misappropriation of investor funds
and misrepresentation of investments.1 Practitioners also recognize the potential
harm from fraud and misconduct by investment managers (e.g., Scharfman (2009)
and Swensen (2000)). This issue has become increasingly relevant in recent years,
as investors have shifted away from direct holdings and into indirect investments
through investment managers (e.g., see French (2008), Table I)).
Despite the significant economic consequences of fraud by investment managers,
academics have produced relatively little research on this topic until recently. In
part, this is because detailed data on investment managers and fraud has only re-
cently become publicly available in a format that permits rigorous academic study.
Indeed, one of the purposes of this chapter is to detail the available data and to
stimulate research in the area by making available the data used in this study
(https://doi.org/10.13023/nsjd-rk62). In addition to stimulating research in this area,
our results provide useful information for regulators and policymakers concerned with
preventing fraud and provide guidance for investors when selecting investment man-
agers.
In this chapter, we provide a systematic examination of all detected fraud cases
committed by registered investment advisors during the period 2001-2016. We docu-
ment the type and extent of fraud and show the relation between fraud and various
characteristics that investment management firms disclose in their Form ADV filings.
These firm characteristics fall into three categories. First, firms with prior regula-
tory, civil law, or criminal violations are significantly more likely to subsequently
commit fraud. Although these prior violations are frequently for minor issues, they
have strong predictive power. Second, conflicts-of-interest predict fraud; fraud is sig-
nificantly more likely to occur at firms that buy securities from or sell securities to
their clients. Third, there is a strong relation between monitoring and fraud. Firms
1Capco (2003) find that 54% of hedge fund failures are caused by operational issues, and 46%
are caused by operational issues that can be classified as forms of fraud.
38
with a dedicated Chief Compliance Officer, an indicator of the strength of internal
monitoring, are less likely to commit fraud. External monitoring by clients is also
important; firms with large clients are less likely to commit fraud, but firms whose
clients are primarily themselves agents are more likely to commit fraud. These results
are consistent with the findings of Dimmock and Gerken (2012) and suggest the prior
paper captured long lived predictive factors.
The economic magnitude of the predictability of fraud is large. An investor who
avoided the 5% of firms with the highest predicted risk of fraud, would successfully
avoid 27.1% of fraud cases and 28.6% of the dollar losses from fraud. We conduct
K-fold cross-validation tests, and show that these results are robust in out-of-sample
data. As an additional test of the predictive ability of the data, we divide the sample
into newly initiated fraud cases and continued fraud cases (cases that were initiated
in a previous year but continue into the subsequent year). We find that our model
can successfully predict 29.8% of newly initiated frauds.
We further divide the sample of frauds into firm-wide frauds, committed by the
firm’s senior executives, and rogue employee fraud, committed by non-executive em-
ployees without the knowledge of senior executives. We find that rogue employee
fraud is much more predictable – avoiding the 5% of firms with the highest fraud risk
would allow an investor to avoid 61.8% of rogue employee frauds. Firm-wide fraud
is less predictable, but our model continues to successfully predict an economically
meaningful proportion of such fraud.
The final empirical results presented in this paper are a true out-of-sample test of
the predictability of investment manager fraud. Dimmock and Gerken (2012) predict
fraud using mandatory disclosures made by investment managers during the 2001-
2006 period. We take the coefficient estimates from Dimmock and Gerken (2012)
and use these to predict fraud detected post-publication. The results show that the
model continues to perform well out-of-sample, although not as well as during the
in-sample period.
2.2 Related Research
This handbook chapter is closely related to Dimmock and Gerken (2012) who use
Form ADV data for the years 2001 to 2006 to predict fraud by investment managers.
They find that disclosures of prior misconduct, conflicts of interest, and monitoring
all have power to predict fraud. Using their model, an investor who avoided the 5%
of firms with the highest fraud risk would have avoided 29.4% of fraud cases and $4
billion in losses. Other studies that predict fraud by investment managers include
Zitzewitz (2006) and Bollen and Pool (2012). Zitzewitz (2006) examines mutual fund
late trading, and shows it can be predicted based on fund-level correlations between
daily mutual fund flows and market returns. Bollen and Pool (2012) show that
suspicious patterns in the reported returns of hedge funds can predict hedge fund
fraud. Gregoriou and Lhabitant (2009) provide a case study of the infamous Ponzi
scheme committed by Bernie Madoff, highlighting operational red flags that hinted
at the potential for fraud.
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Instead of predicting fraud, Gurun et al. (2018) focus on how fraud by investment
managers affects investor behavior. They find that fraud results in investors with-
drawing assets from investment managers. However, this effect is mitigated by trust
building activities. Gurun et al. (2018) also highlight an important spillover effect
from fraud by investment managers: In addition to direct losses financial losses, fraud
causes a decline in trust that results in reduced stock market participation, which has
potentially large welfare losses due to forgone investment opportunities.
The mutual fund late trading scandal motivated multiple academic studies of
fraud by investment managers. Houge and Wellman (2005), Choi and Kahan (2007),
Chapman-Davies, Parwada, and Tan (2014), and Wu (2018) examine investors’ reac-
tions to the revelation of mutual fund scandals, and find that the fund families impli-
cated in these scandals suffered large outflows. Goetzmann, Ivković, and Rouwenhorst
(2001) and Zitzewitz (2003) propose pricing methods that prevent the possibility of
late-trading arbitrage.
Another branch of the literature on fraud by investment managers examines return
misreporting by hedge funds.2 Bollen and Pool (2008) find evidence of conditional
return smoothing in the returns reported by hedge funds; hedge funds appear to
quickly report positive returns, but smooth out the reporting of bad returns over
multiple months. Bollen and Pool (2009) show the returns reported by hedge funds
exhibit a strong discontinuity around zero; hedge fund are nearly twice as likely to
report a small positive return as a small negative return. Further, this discontinuity
does not occur in the months when the hedge fund is audited. Agarwal, Daniel,
and Naik (2011) show that hedge funds report significantly higher returns in the last
month of their fiscal year (i.e., the month when the hedge fund manager’s annual
incentive fee is calculated). Ben-David, Franzoni, Landier, and Moussawi (2013)
show that hedge funds manipulate stock prices at quarter ends, and this is affected
by incentive fees and relative performance considerations. Cici, Kempf, and Puetz
(2016) show direct evidence of valuation misreporting by hedge funds. They compare
the individual stock valuations reported by hedge funds in their 13F filings with the
stock prices in the CRSP database, and find that 7% of all equity positions reported by
hedge funds are misvalued. Further, stock value misreporting is correlated with hedge
funds’ incentives to misreport, and with the return misreporting patterns documented
by Bollen and Pool (2009) and Agarwal et al. (2011).
Following the discovery of these patterns of return misreporting by hedge funds,
various authors studied different mechanisms that can reduce misreporting. Cumming
and Dai (2010a) and Cumming and Dai (2010b) show that across-country variation in
legal restrictions on hedge fund is related to return misreporting, and Cumming and
Dai (2009) show that hedge fund regulation is related to capital flows. Cumming, Dai,
and Johan (2015a) show that hedge funds subject to Delaware state law are different
than funds incorporated in other states. Dimmock and Gerken (2016) use changes in
hedge fund registration requirements in the U.S. to evaluate how regulatory oversight
affects return misreporting. They find that return misreporting decreased following
2Agarwal, Mullally, and Naik (2015, Section 3.3) provide an excellent review of studies on
operational risk and fraud in hedge funds.
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a mandatory registration requirement, but then increased again following the rever-
sal of this requirement. A later study, Honigsberg (2019), independently replicates
the finding of Dimmock and Gerken (2016). Cassar and Gerakos (2011) show that
stronger internal control systems by hedge fund managers reduce the occurrence of
return misreporting. Jylha (2011) shows that misreporting is significantly greater
when hedge fund managers have stronger financial incentives to misreport. Clifford,
Ellis, and Gerken (2018) study the relation between hedge fund fraud and boards of
directors. They find that hedge funds with independent directors on their boards are
significantly less likely to engage in fraud, and the economic magnitudes of this effect
are large. Finally, in a cross-country study Kang, Kim, and Jun Oh (2016) exam-
ine the relation between national cultures and return manipulation by hedge funds,
and find more manipulation in cultures with greater individualism, masculinity, and
power distance.
Brown, Goetzmann, Liang, and Schwarz (2008) and Brown, Goetzmann, Liang,
and Schwarz (2009) examine the relation between information disclosed in Form ADV
filings and operational risk of hedge funds. Brown et al. define operational risk as any
fund managed by an advisor who has disclosed any past legal or regulatory violation
(committed either by the hedge fund adviser itself, any non-hedge fund advisory part
of the firm, or by any affiliated firm). They show that this measure of operational
risk is correlated with various organizational features of the hedge fund adviser. They
also show their measure of operational risk is correlated with fund performance and
survival, but is not correlated with hedge fund flows. Brown, Goetzmann, Liang,
and Schwarz (2012) find similar results using due diligence reports rather than Form
ADV disclosures.
This chapter is also related to a recent, but growing literature on misconduct by
individual financial advisors employed by investment advisory firms. Charoenwong,
Kwan, and Umar (2017) provide evidence that the identity of the regulator influ-
ences misconduct committed by individual advisors at regulated firms. Dimmock,
Gerken, and Graham (2018a) show there are peer effects in misconduct by financial
advisors; individual advisors are significantly more likely to commit misconduct if
they are exposed to co-workers who commit misconduct. Egan, Matvos, and Seru
(2019) explore how misconduct affects the labor market for financial advisors. They
find that misconduct frequently results in financial advisors being fired, but many
are subsequently rehired and certain firms seem to specialize in misconduct. Egan,
Matvos, and Seru (2017) study gender differences in the punishment for misconduct
by financial advisors, finding that women are more likely to be fired and less likely
to be rehired following misconduct. Dimmock, Gerken, and Van Alfen (2019) study
exogenous shocks to financial advisors’ wealth caused by real estate price changes dur-
ing the financial crisis, and find that advisors are significantly more likely to commit
misconduct following a negative wealth shock.
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2.3 The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and Mandatory Disclosures
Our data about investment managers come primarily from mandatory disclosures
required by the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (IAA).3 The IAA authorizes the
SEC to regulate investment advisers, and requires investment advisers to comply
with detailed anti-fraud provisions, to register with the SEC, and to disclose certain
information.
The IAA requires advisers to register with the SEC if the adviser has 15 or more
U.S. clients and more than a certain level of assets under management (AUM). The
level of AUM requiring registration was increased from $25 million to $100 million
on January 1, 2012. Advisers not required to register with the SEC are generally
required to register with state regulators (for further information on registration re-
quirements see Charoenwong et al. (2017)). The IAA defines an investment adviser
as an individual or legal entity that is compensated for providing advice regarding
investment securities. Historically, some hedge fund advisers avoided the registra-
tion requirement by counting each fund as a client, rather than counting the fund’s
investors. In 2004, the SEC passed Rule IA-2333 requiring hedge funds to count
investors instead of funds for the purpose of determining whether registration was
necessary. In 2006, a Federal Court overruled Rule IA-2333 and some hedge funds
deregistered. The Dodd-Frank Act included a provision requiring hedge fund advi-
sors to count investors and not funds, forcing many hedge fund advisors to register
beginning in 2011 (see Cumming et al. (2015a) for further discussion of the effects of
Dodd-Frank on hedge funds).
Registration with the SEC requires an investment advisor to comply with strict
recordkeeping requirements, prohibits certain types of fees, and imposes some other
restrictions on behaviors. Most importantly, for the purposes of this chapter, regis-
tered investment advisors are required to disclose certain information by filing Form
ADV.4 Registered investment advisors must file Form ADV at least annually, but
must also refile if there are any material changes to the disclosed information. Form
ADV reports a large amount of information about the investment advisor’s business,
conflicts of interest, and past legal and regulatory violations.
2.4 Data
In this chapter, we employ two primary types of data: SEC filings regarding invest-
ment fraud by U.S. registered investment advisors and disclosures made by these
investment advisors in their Form ADV filing. We combine the two data sources by
matching on the firms’ Central Registration Depository (CRD) number;5 if the CRD
3For a detailed explanation of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and its provisions, see
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/iaregulation/memoia.htm.
4There are six distinct versions of Form ADV over our sample period. While the vast majority
of disclosures are the same throughout, Form ADV has expanded reporting for certain types of
information (e.g., AUM by clientele).
5The CRD number is a unique identification number that identifies an investment management
firm. It is similar to the permco variable in CRSP.
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number is not available in the SEC fraud filings, we match using full legal names.
2.4.1 Investment Fraud
We collect investment fraud data by searching two sources on the SEC’s enforcement
action website: administrative proceedings6 and litigation releases7 for the period
August 1, 2001 to December 31, 2016. We mechanically search the filings for phrases
related to “fraud” and “investment adviser” (or “investment advisor”). From these
subset of documents, we then identify by hand all case filings that involve violations
of the anti-fraud provisions in the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. We do not
include types of fraud or misconduct committed by an investment advisor that do
not directly affect investment advisor clients (e.g., defrauding brokerage clients), nor
do we include misconduct that potentially benefits the investment advisor’s clients
(e.g., insider trading).
Many fraud cases occur over multiple years and are often detected years after
initiation. In our sample, we read all legal filings for each fraud case and identify the
period when fraud occurred. We then assign the fraud case to the year(s) when it
was committed, not the year when it was detected. To illustrate, Figure 2.1 shows an
example of one fraud case. In 2012, Veros Partners solicited clients to invest in a new
fund that would provide short-term operating loans to farmers; Veros made loans to
farmers, but the loans were not repaid. In the spring of 2013 and again in the spring
of 2014, Veros solicited clients to invest in a new fund that would provide short-term
financing for farmers, but instead used the proceeds to repay investors in the earlier
funds (and to pay Veros managers undisclosed “success fees”). The SEC filed civil
charges against Veros and its management in April 2015. In September of 2016,
the SEC signed a consent agreement in which the Veros management team agreed
to sanctions and repayment. A criminal trial was scheduled for February 2017. We
classify this as a single fraud case occurring in 2013 and 2014, with detection occurring
in 2015.
The SEC administrative proceedings and litigation releases include investment
fraud committed by both registered and unregistered investment advisors. Although
our empirical tests use only the sample of registered advisors, Panel A of Table 2.1
summarizes fraud by both registered and unregistered advisors. There are 639 fraud
cases committed by registered advisors and 342 cases by non-registered advisors.
Columns (2) and (3) divide the fraud cases into “firm-wide” versus “rogue employee”
fraud. Firm-wide frauds are either committed by senior executives or occurs with
their knowledge and, at the very least, implicit acceptance. Rogue employee frauds
are committed by non-executive employees who evade their firms’ internal control
systems. The vast majority of fraud is firm-wide fraud, comprising 95.9% and 82.8%
of cases at unregistered and registered advisors, respectively.
The final column of Panel A shows the aggregate losses to investors during this
period were $45.6 billion, which almost certainly understates losses as we are unable
to determine a dollar amount in 22.4% of the cases. Panel B of Table 2.1 summarizes
6See https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin.shtml.
7See https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases.shtml.
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the distribution of losses for fraud committed by registered advisors. The average loss
was $78.8 million, with losses for firm-wide fraud substantially larger than for rogue
employee fraud. Panel B also summarizes the duration of fraud cases. The median
fraud persists for three years, but this is positively skewed as a small number of cases
persist for over a decade.
Figure 2.2 shows the number of detected fraud cases by year. For each year, the
dark bars show the number of initiated frauds and the light bars show the number of
ongoing frauds for the firms in the ADV sample. The figure includes only fraud cases
that were ongoing during the 2001-2016 sample period. Thus, the reported cases for
1984-2000 include only those frauds initiated prior to 2001 that continued into the
sample period. The number of initiated frauds is stable early in the sample, but rises
during the financially crisis and then declines. The number of ongoing frauds shows a
similar pattern. The rise during the financial crisis suggests that investment advisors
may be more likely to commit fraud when asset markets perform poorly. The decline
in both initiated and ongoing fraud cases towards the end of the sample highlights
an important feature of fraud data. Although it is possible that investment fraud has
become much less frequent in recent years, another important factor is that fraud is
detected with a significant lag. Thus, the low rates of fraud in 2014 onward likely
reflect, at least in part, that recent frauds have not yet been detected rather than a
decrease in the actual commission of fraud.
Table 2.2 summarizes the types of fraud committed by registered investment advi-
sors. Direct theft occurs when an advisor directly steals money from clients (but does
not include theft through related party transactions nor Ponzi schemes). Misrepre-
sentation occurs when an advisor makes material misrepresentations to a client, and
does not commit other acts that would fall under another category (all fraud involves
an element of misrepresentation). This includes cases in which an advisor lies about
assets under management or past returns, or lies about past misconduct (e.g., falsely
denies prior sanctions by regulators). Self-dealing includes a wide-range of behaviors
that involve transactions between clients and parties related to the investment advi-
sor. Examples include: front-running, in which the advisor purchases securities ahead
of client orders and then resells them at slightly higher prices; trading between client
accounts and a proprietary trading desk at prices unfavorable to the client; brokerage
fraud, in which the advisor trades through an affiliated broker at terms that are un-
favorable to the client and have not been adequately disclosed; and ex post allocation
of trades, in which the advisor purchases securities but delays assigning them to a
specific account, and instead waits to assign winners to the proprietary trading desk
and losers to clients. Overstating assets occurs when an advisor overstates the value
of assets under management, and charges advisory fees based on these inflated values.
A Ponzi scheme occurs when an advisor uses investment inflows to meet investment
outflows. Mutual fund late trading occurs when an advisor allows some investors to
transact shares after a fund’s net asset value has been calculated for the day.
The summary statistics in Table 2.2 show that Direct theft is the most common
type of fraud, followed by Misrepresentation and Self-dealing, with Overstate assets,
Ponzi scheme, and Mutual fund late trading being relatively less common. However,
the losses per case are particularly large for Ponzi scheme and Mutual fund late
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trading. We also report in parentheses summary statistics that exclude the sizable
Madoff Ponzi scheme which represents over 65% of total Ponzi scheme losses. The
percent of total losses and the average loss per case remain highest for Ponzi schemes
regardless of this exclusion.
2.4.2 Form ADV Data and Variables
The SEC website allows the public to view the information disclosed in an investment
advisor’s most recent Form ADV filing.8 The SEC also provides access to monthly
historical snapshots of Form ADV filings. These publicly available files do not include
Schedules A, B, or C, or the DRP filings that detail past misconduct. Also, detailed
data on free response fields such as the private fund information in Section 7.B. are
also not available. For filings prior to November 2009, the snapshots include only a
limited summary of select Form ADV variables (and no data of any type is available
for filings prior to June 2006). For this study, we obtained the complete set of his-
torical Form ADV variables through a Freedom of Information Act request. Another
complication for researchers using these data is that Form ADV has been altered mul-
tiple times changing the mapping of variable names to form questions across different
versions of the forms. To facilitate access to the complete Form ADV data for other
researchers, we have made these data available at https://doi.org/10.13023/nsjd-rk62.
Following Dimmock and Gerken (2012) and Dimmock, Gerken, and Marietta-
Westberg (2015), we use Form ADV data to construct an annual panel of registered
investment advisors. Table 2.3 summarizes the Form ADV variables from each firm’s
first Form ADV filed from 2000 to 2015. Panel A summarizes the continuous variables
and Panel B summarizes the binary variables.
Employee ownership is the percentage of the firm that is owned by employees and
is calculated following the methodology in Dimmock et al. (2015). This variable ac-
counts for indirect employee ownership through trusts and pass-through entities. The
majority of firms in the sample are wholly employee owned. We include this variable
because ownership affects both the incentives and the oversight of the firm. Owners
receive the benefits of committing fraud, but also bear the full reputational penalty if
fraud is detected. More generally, employee ownership eliminates the principal-agent
problem between the managers and owners (although the agency conflict between
clients and the firm remains). Firm age (in years) is included in all regressions as a
control for the firm’s reputational capital that would be at risk if the firm committed
fraud.
Assets under management (AUM) is the total market value of the assets managed
by the advisory firm. AUM is highly skewed; in 2015, the largest 1% of advisors
managed more than half of the industry’s total AUM. Average account size is the
firm’s AUM divided by the number of clients. The definition of client includes both
people and investment vehicles (i.e., an investment company with multiple investors
is counted as a single client). Average account size is also highly skewed. Percent
8The filings of individual firms are available at https://www.adviserinfo.sec.gov/.
Bulk downloads of some of the information in historical filings are available at
https://www.sec.gov/help/foiadocsinvafoiahtm.html.
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client agents is the percentage of the firm’s clients that are agents rather than direct
beneficiaries of the invested funds (e.g., pension funds or other investment advisors).
All of these variables are related to monitoring and oversight. There is likely greater
investor oversight when total AUM and AUM per client are higher. Clients who
are themselves agents have weaker incentives, but possibly greater expertise, than
principals.
Panel B of Table 2.3 summarizes the binary independent variables, and includes
univariate significance tests comparing fraud firms and clean firms (firms that do
not commit fraud during the sample period). The first group of variables measure
disclosures of past misconduct. Past fraud identifies firms that a prior SEC filing
identifies as having committed investment management fraud (it does not include
other forms of fraud that did not affect the firm’s investment advisory clients). Past
fraud includes only fraud cases that have already been publicly identified and that
have ended. Past affiliated fraud identifies firms that have an affiliated firm that has
previously committed investment management fraud. (Affiliated firms are any firm
that controls, is controlled by, or is under common control.) Past regulatory identifies
firms that disclose past regulatory violations. Past civil or criminal identifies firms
that disclose past civil or criminal violations. For the regulatory, civil, and criminal
violations, we include disclosures related to the firm as well as disclosures related
to employees of the firm. As shown by the paired t-test results, firms with past
misconduct are more likely to subsequently commit fraud.
The next group of variables are disclosures of potential conflicts of interest. Re-
ferral fees identifies firms that pay a third party for referring clients to the firm. This
practice creates a potential conflict of interest for the third party, and could facilitate
the flow of funds to asset managers who commit fraud. Interest in transaction iden-
tifies firms that trade directly with their clients, or recommend securities in which
the firm has an ownership or any other type of sales interest. Soft dollars identifies
firms that receive research or other products or services from a broker in connection
with clients’ securities transactions. Broker in firm identifies firms that employ reg-
istered representatives of a broker-dealer. Interest in transactions, Soft dollars, and
Broker in firm can all create conflicts of interest and provide mechanisms for self-
dealing through related parties. The univariate t-tests show that firms with Interest
in transactions, Broker in firm, and Soft dollars all have higher rates of fraud.
The final group of variables measure oversight and monitoring. Investment Com-
pany Act identifies firms that manage funds on behalf of an investment company
registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (e.g., mutual funds); this Act
requires certain disclosures and monitoring by independent directors, among other
requirements. Custody identifies firms that have direct custody of their clients’ as-
sets. Custody facilitates many types of fraud, although firms with custody of clients’
assets are subject to more stringent audit requirements including at least one “sur-
prise” audit each year.9 Dedicated CCO identifies firms whose Chief Compliance
Officer (CCO) has no other formal role at the firm. All registered investment ad-
9SEC Rule IA-2968 became effective on March 12, 2010 and enhanced the regulatory safeguards
to prevent misconduct when the investment advisor and custodian are related parties, including
requiring use of an auditor registered with and following the standards of the Professional Company
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visors are required to designate a CCO, who is responsible for ensuring compliance
with all regulatory requirements. At many firms, however, the CCO also holds other
roles within the firm. Hedge fund clients identifies firms at which 75% or more of the
clients are “pooled investment vehicles (other than investment companies),” as this
indicates a relatively sophisticated client base.
2.5 Predicting Fraud and Misconduct
In this section, we test whether it is possible to use the disclosure information summa-
rized above to predict fraud by investment managers. The purpose of these regressions
is to show variables that predict fraud; as such, these regressions provide potentially
useful information to investors selecting asset managers or to regulators allocating
monitoring resources. We do not claim that these regressions show causality. In-
vestment managers jointly choose organizational structures and business practices
along with the decision of whether to commit fraud. Thus, our results should not be
interpreted to imply it would be desirable to change or prohibit practices that are
correlated with misconduct.
As noted in the data section, our dependent variable is detected fraud. It is
highly likely that there are undetected fraud cases committed by firms in our sample.
Thus, any significant relation between an independent variable and fraud measures
both that variable’s relation with the actual commission of fraud and the variable’s
relation with the probability of detection conditional upon commission. Investment
advisors who intend to commit fraud should select business practices that hinder the
detection of fraud, which will bias towards zero the coefficient estimates in empirical
tests.
This handbook chapter provides novel insights into how undetected fraud affects
predictive tests of fraud by investment managers. This chapter builds heavily upon
Dimmock and Gerken (2012), who run predictive tests within the sample period 2001-
2006. This current chapter includes a significantly longer time period, and includes
fraud cases that occurred during the period 2001-2006 but were not detected until
after the publication of Dimmock and Gerken (2012), allowing us to examine how
the subsequent detection of these cases alters the inference in the earlier article.
Additionally, it also allows for a true out-of-sample (post-publication) test of the
models in Dimmock and Gerken (2012).
2.5.1 Predicting Fraud by Investment Managers
Panel A of Table 2.4 shows the results of probit regressions that predict fraud by
investment managers. In column (1), the sample is a cross-section of the investment
management firms with one observation per firm. The independent variables are taken
from each firm’s first Form ADV filing, and the dependent variable equals one if the
firm ever commits fraud during the sample period. In columns (2)-(5), the sample is
a panel of firm-year observations. The independent variables are based on the Form
Accounting Oversight Board (see Bedard, Cannon, and Schnader (2014) for more details).
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ADV data as of the firm’s most recent filing before the beginning of the calendar
year, and the dependent variable equals one if the firm commits fraud during the
subsequent year. Columns (2) and (3) include all firm-years with valid data. Column
(4) excludes firms with a prior history of fraud. Column (5) excludes firms that have,
or are affiliated with another firm that has, any prior legal or regulatory violations. In
column (1), the reported standard errors are robust. In columns (2)-(5), the reported
standard errors are clustered by firm. The model χ2 at the bottom of each column
shows the significance of the overall model.
Past fraud and Past affiliated fraud are both insignificant predictors of future
fraud. There are very few (surviving) firms with a history of past fraud, so the
power for these coefficients is quite low. This finding is identical to that of Dimmock
and Gerken (2012), who estimated a similar relation over a much shorter time-period.
Indeed, Panel A of Table 2.4 contains more than twice as many firm-year observations
as in the earlier study. Despite the large expansion of the sample size, the results are
similar. Given the similarity of the results, for the remaining independent variables
we compare with the results of Dimmock and Gerken (2012) only for those results
that differ.
Past regulatory and Past civil or criminal violations both have a strong posi-
tive relation with fraud. Such prior violations are likely indicative of poor internal
controls, unethical management, or other underlying problems within a firm. Prior
violations, may also increase scrutiny by regulators and investors, increasing the rate
of detection conditional upon the occurrence of fraud. Form ADV requires advisors
to disclose their own past violations as well as all violations by affiliated firms, thus
prior violations are generally higher for firms that are affiliated with more firms. Such
affiliations may increase conflicts of interest or create a mechanism for fraudulent self-
dealing, resulting in fraud.
Investment advisors that pay Referral fees to third parties for client recommen-
dations have significantly higher rates of fraud. Referral fees represent a potential
conflict of interest and may indicate a general lack of ethics in a firm. Fraudulent
firms may also be more willing to pay referral fees because they may find acquiring
clients relatively difficult, as they cannot survive standard due diligence procedures.
Further, frauds such as Ponzi schemes require a constant inflow of investors, creating
a strong incentive to pay for referrals.
The coefficient estimate on Interest in transaction is highly significant. Firms
that trade directly with their own clients have higher rates of fraud. Trading directly
with clients is an obvious conflict of interest and may indicate a lack of ethics. Client
transactions also provide a mechanism for committing fraud. For example, front-
running clients’ trades or pump-and-dump schemes depend on trading directly with
the client.
Soft dollars is not significantly related to fraud. The use of soft dollars is a poten-
tial conflict of interest, and soft dollar abuse can rise to the level of fraud. However,
prior to the beginning of our sample period the SEC aggressively cracked down on soft
dollar abuse, following a series of inspections in 1998 that found 28% of investment
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advisors misused soft dollars.10 This result is suggestive that the regulatory changes
made in response to the 1998 report were successful.
Broker in firm is not significantly related to fraud (except in column (1)). Trad-
ing through an affiliated brokerage firm enables certain types of fraud (e.g., ex post
allocation of trades or front-running) and removes one possible source or external
oversight. However, brokerages must register with the SEC and are subject to ad-
ditional regulatory requirements (e.g., SEC and FINRA broker-dealer examinations
and inspections) and auditing requirements, which may discourage the commission of
fraud. Alternatively, it may be more difficult to detect fraud committed through an
affiliated brokerage firm, reducing the detection of fraud rather than its occurrence.
There is a positive, albeit weak, relation between fraud and Investment Company
Act. This result is mainly driven by the mutual fund late trading scandal, and the
coefficient estimates are considerably smaller than in Dimmock and Gerken (2012),
suggesting this finding may reflect past practices and may not be predictive of future
misconduct.
Custody of client assets is negatively related to fraud. Although custody poten-
tially facilitates fraud, it also increases regulatory scrutiny and comes with enhanced
audit and regulatory requirements. There are two possible interpretations of this
result. First, the increased audit requirements are sufficient to outweigh any ef-
fect through which custody facilitates fraud. Second, even with the increased audit
requirements, custody allows fraudulent advisors to avoid detection, and thus the
weakly negative relation reflects a difference in the detection rate. Dimmock and
Gerken (2012) did not find a relation between Custody and fraud, and the regula-
tory requirements were made more stringent since the end of the sample used in that
paper, suggesting that it is more likely that the enhanced regulatory requirements
reduce the occurrence of fraud.
Dedicated CCO and Majority employee owned both measure types of internal
governance. Dedicated CCO, indicating firms with a Chief Compliance Officer who
has no other formal role, is negatively associated with fraud. This can be interpreted
as a signal of how seriously a firm takes compliance issues, and is thus related to a
reduced propensity to commit fraud. Alternatively, it is possible that Dedicated CCO
causes a reduction in fraud via internal monitoring and oversight. Majority employee
owned is not significantly related to fraud.
There is a negative relation between fraud and the logarithm of the average ac-
count size. This is consistent with monitoring and due diligence by large investors.
Large investors have more resources for screening investment advisors, greater famil-
iarity with best practices, and stronger incentives to monitor advisors. Percent client
agents, on the other hand, is positively related with fraud. Clients who are agents
(e.g., pension funds or charitable trusts), have weaker incentives to screen and mon-
itor investment advisors relative to clients who invest their own funds. Hedge fund
clients is not significantly related to fraud.
Neither Log(AUM) nor Log(firm age) are consistently associated with fraud. Dim-
mock and Gerken (2012) found a positive relation between fraud and Log(AUM), but
10For more details see https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/softdolr.htm#sweep.
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this relation appears to have been driven primarily by the mutual fund later trading
scandal in the early part of the sample and does not persist in the later part of the
sample.
2.5.2 Interpreting the Predictive Content of the Models
The χ2 test results at the bottom of each column in Panel A of Table 2.4 show
that the fraud prediction models are highly statistically significant. These results
do not provide, however, the economic meaning of the predictability in an easily
interpretable form. In this section, we examine the economic interpretation of the
probit regression results. Figure 3 shows the receiver operating characteristic (ROC)
curve for the probit regression in column (3) of Table 2.4. Predicting fraud involves
a tradeoff between correctly identifying fraud cases (sensitivity) versus false positives
from incorrectly classifying clean firms as fraudulent (1-specificity). The ROC curve
visually displays this tradeoff. The y-axis displays the proportion of fraud cases
correctly predicted and the x-axis displays the proportion of false positives. If the
model has no predictive power, and thus classifies fraud firms essentially at random,
the ROC curve will be a 45-degree line. The ROC curve in Figure 2.3 rises steeply
at first, indicating that a sizeable fraction of frauds can be predicted with a low
false positive rate. The relatively flat slope in the upper right portion of the graph
indicates that a small fraction of frauds are very difficult to detect.
As an alternative means of displaying the tradeoff between predicting fraud versus
false positives, Panel B of Table 2.4 summarizes the within-sample predictive perfor-
mance of the model. Following Dechow, Ge, Larson, and Sloan (2011), we select the
cutoff point that produces a false positive rate of 5% and summarize the model’s
predictive accuracy (i.e., we set the cutoff level by taking the predicted value from
the probit regression such that 5% of clean firms have a predicted value equal or
higher, and 95% of clean firms have a lower predicted value). We then summarize the
number and proportion of fraudulent firms with a predicted value equal to or higher
than the cutoff point.
In the full sample results, shown in column (3), the model successfully predicts
27.1% of frauds with a false positive rate of 5%. In column (4), in which the sample is
limited to include only firms with no prior fraud cases, the model successfully predicts
26.2% of frauds. The predictive accuracy is substantially lower in column (5), in
which the sample is limited to exclude all firms with any prior legal or regulatory
violation. In this restricted sample, the model predicts 13.2% of frauds with a false
positive rate of 5%. This highlights the importance of past legal and regulatory
disclosures in predicting fraud. Indeed, although only 19.8% of firm-year observations
have a past violation, these firm-years contain 46.6% of fraud observations. The
comparison between the final column and the earlier columns shows the importance
of the mandatory disclosures in Form ADV. Although many of the disclosures are for
minor issues, any prior misconduct is a strong predictor of future fraud.
The last row in Panel B shows the proportion of total dollar losses from fraud that
could have been avoided based on the prediction model (assuming the investor avoided
all firms with a predicted probability of committing fraud equal to or higher than the
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cutoff level that produces a 5% false positive rate). In all columns, the proportion
of dollar losses avoided is similar to the proportion of fraud cases predicted. That
is, the models seem to predict large and small fraud cases with equal accuracy. This
differs from Dimmock and Gerken (2012) who found more accurate predictions for
larger frauds.
2.5.3 K-Fold Cross-Validation Tests
A common concern for predictive models is overfitting – that the within-sample pre-
diction rate overstates out-of-sample performance. In this section, we perform model
assessment using k-fold cross-validation (see James, Witten, Hastie, and Tibshirani
(2014, Chapter 5) for an excellent introduction to both model assessment and k-fold
cross-validation). For these tests, we randomly assign each firm to one of 10 groups.
Importantly, we randomize at the firm (and not firm-year) level to avoid across-time
dependence within firm observations. We then designate one of the groups as the
hold-out sample, estimate the model using observations from the other nine groups,
and use these coefficient estimates to predict fraud in the hold-out sample. We repeat
this procedure for each of the 10 groups. We then repeat this procedure 20 times,
resulting in 200 separate out-of-sample comparison groups, and report the average
number of fraud cases successfully predicted.
The k-fold cross-validation results in Panel C of Table 2.4 show that the out-
of-sample performance of the models is very similar to the in-sample performance.
For the baseline model, shown in column (3), on average we predict only 0.2 fewer
frauds out-of-sample. The standard deviation of the number of frauds predicted,
along with the minimum and maximum numbers, show the results are very stable
across iterations of the cross-validation tests. Finally, the results at the bottom of the
panel show that the false positive rate is not substantially larger out-of-sample than
in-sample. Overall, these results support that the validity of the predictive models.
2.6 Predicting the Initiation vs. the Continuance of Fraud
In the baseline mode, the dependent variable includes frauds that are newly initiated
in the next year as well as frauds that were previously initiated and continue into
the next year. Predicting fraud prior to initiation is potentially more valuable than
predicting continued frauds. Additionally, ongoing fraud can alter the predictive
ADV variables, obscuring the distinction between predicting new acts of fraud and
detection of ongoing cases. Both are potentially interesting, but differentiating them
could reveal offsetting effects (e.g., if some variable is positively related to initiation
of fraud, but causes the fraud to be detected earlier shorting its continuation). In
this section, we separate newly initiated and continued fraud cases and estimate a
sequential logit model of initiation and continuance of fraud (see Buis (2011) for
further discussion of the sequential logit model).
Panel A of Table 2.5 presents the regression results. Column (1) predicts the
initiation of fraud in the subsequent year, while column (2) predicts whether a firm
that had already initiated a fraud will continue this fraud case in the subsequent
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year. Standard errors are clustered by firm. In general, the coefficient estimates in
column (1) are larger than those presented in Table 4. In contrast, the coefficient
estimates in column (2) are smaller than those presented in Table 4. The overall
pattern of results suggests that the Form ADV variables are better at predicting the
initiation of fraud than at predicting which initiated fraud cases will continue. There
is, however, a change in both sign and significance for Past fraud and Past affiliated
fraud in column (2) relative to the full model in Table 2.4. The negative coefficient on
Past Fraud is consistent with past offenders having new instances of fraud detected
sooner and thus being unable to continue the scheme, consistent with the firm’s past
actions attracting greater regulatory scrutiny. The positive and significant loading on
Past affiliated fraud indicates that past instances of fraud at affiliated firms predict
the continuance of fraud at a firm.
Panel B of Table 2.5 shows that at a false positive rate of 5% the model correctly
predicts 29.8% of fraud cases initiated in the next year.11 This is slightly higher than
the baseline model prediction rate (27.1%), suggesting the Form ADV data can be
used to predict the initiation of fraud and not just the continuation of previously
initiated cases.
2.7 Firm-Wide Fraud vs. Fraud by a Rogue Employee
Investment management fraud can be “firm-wide” as in the Madoff Ponzi scheme,
where the firm’s owners and senior managers were actively involved in perpetrating
the fraud. In such cases, the same individuals who choose to commit fraud also choose
the firm’s organizational structure and business practices. Thus, firm-wide fraud may
be correlated with practices that are deliberately chosen to enable fraud. Investment
management fraud can also be committed by a rogue employee, who must evade the
firm’s oversight procedures and who cannot alter the firm’s policies to enable the
fraud. Thus, rogue employee fraud may be correlated with weak internal controls. In
this section, we examine the distinction between these two types of frauds.
Panel A of Table 2.6 presents the results of a multinomial probit regression predict-
ing fraud. The dependent variable in column (1) is equal to one if the firm commits
a firm-wide fraud in the subsequent year. The dependent variable in column (2) is
equal to one if a rogue employee commits fraud in the subsequent year. The coeffi-
cient estimates in both columns are generally similar with a few exceptions. Past civil
or criminal is significant only for rogue employee fraud, suggesting that firms with
prior civil violations or who hire criminals likely have relatively weak internal control
systems. Rogue employee fraud is significantly less common at Majority employee
owned firms, which suggests managerial ownership improves monitoring incentives.
Percent client agent has a significant positive relation with firm-wide fraud; this is
likely an endogenous relation with fraudulent firms targeting a client base with re-
duced incentives for monitoring. Firm-wide fraud is significantly lower at older firms,
11We do not report the proportion of continued fraud cases predicted, because for continued
frauds it is only possible to make predictions conditional upon knowing with certainty which firms
were committing fraud in the prior year, which is not a reasonable assumption.
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consistent with the argument that reputational capital provides a disincentive for
fraud.
Panel B of Table 2.6 shows the proportion of fraud cases that can be predicted
at a false positive rate of 5%. Firm-wide fraud is considerably more difficult to
predict; the model successfully predicts 20.5% of firm-wide frauds versus 61.8% of
rogue employee frauds. With firm-wide fraud, the senior management can choose
policies and procedures that decrease the probability that fraud is detected, and the
fraud is unlikely to be detected by internal monitoring procedures. Thus, firm-wide
fraud is more difficult to detect.
2.8 Out-of-Sample Prediction and Model Stability
The true test of a predictive model (and the value of its inputs – in this case the
SEC’s mandated disclosures via Form ADV) is its out-of-sample performance. In
this chapter we revisit the tests of Dimmock and Gerken (2012), which allows us an
opportunity to evaluate the out-of-sample performance of the models in that paper by
applying the predictions to post-publication data. We graphically display this out-of-
sample performance in Figure 2.4. This figure uses the model estimates from column
(3) of Table 3 of Dimmock and Gerken (2012), which was estimated on fraud data
for the period 2001-2006. For each year from 2001-2015, we show both the sensitivity
(proportion of fraud cases correctly predicted) and 1 specificity (proportion of clean
firms incorrectly labelled as fraud firms) for the model. The cutoff for classifying a
firm as a fraud firm is set so that 1 specificity within sample is equal to 5%. The
prediction sample for Figure 2.4 includes two types of out-of-sample fraud cases.
First, we use frauds that were initiated in the 2001-2006 period, but which were not
detected until after the data were collected for the 2012 article. Second, we use frauds
that were initiated and detected after 2006. Before proceeding to discuss the results
in Figure 2.4, it is worth revisiting the findings in Figure 2.2, which show the fraud
cases in our sample by year. As Figure 2.2 shows, there are relatively few fraud cases
in the later years of our sample, with particularly few cases in 2014 and 2015. This
likely reflects the fact that fraud is detected with a lag, and thus the later years of
the sample likely contain many fraud cases that have not yet been detected.
Figure 2.4 shows that the proportion of fraud cases correctly identified was highest
in the early years of the estimation sample. This period had a large number of mutual
fund late trading cases, which the model does an excellent job of predicting. Moving
to the out-of-sample period, the model predicts approximately 20% of fraud cases
during the period 2007-2011, and does so with a false prediction rate that is lower
than 5% (fewer false predictions out-of-sample than in-sample). The model’s out-
of-sample performance becomes more volatile in the period 2012-2015 as the sample
of fraud cases becomes smaller. Unfortunately, the time-series evidence is unable
to disentangle alternative explanations for the relative drop in model performance.
Model performance could decline post-publication because regulators (and investment
managers) could shift behavior (i.e., a form of the Lucas critique). Specifically, the
SEC significantly increased access to Form ADV data in line with the suggestions
of Dimmock and Gerken (2012), which could have increased the deterrence effects
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of these disclosures. Another confounding factor is that there were other significant
regulatory changes due to the implementation of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act during this period. The decrease in model power in
the later years, due to fewer fraud observations, also means we cannot dismiss the
possibility that the decrease is due simply to chance. Overall, the model continues to
perform well out-of-sample, although apparently not as well as in-sample, suggesting
that the mandated disclosures still contain useful information to predict fraudulent
activity.
2.9 Policy Implications and Conclusions
Consistent with Dimmock and Gerken (2012), we find that mandatory disclosures
related to past regulatory and legal violations, conflicts of interest, and monitoring are
significant predictors of fraud by investment managers. Further, these variables can
predict both the initiation and continuation of fraud, as well as firm-wide and rogue-
employee fraud. The predictions perform well both in- and out-of-sample. The results
clearly show that the mandatory disclosures made by investment managers contain
useful and relevant information for the investing public. Until 2011, the SEC did not
provide public access to historical Form ADV data through its website. Shortly after
the initial public circulation of the working paper version of Dimmock and Gerken
(2012), the SEC began to provide access to monthly snapshots of historical Form ADV
data.12 However, those publicly available files on the SEC website do not contain all
of the information provided in Form ADV filings, and these data are severely limited
prior to 2010 reducing their usefulness to researchers.13
We believe that improving public access to comprehensive historical disclosures
could increase the benefits these disclosures were meant to provide. Our models
incorporate only a fraction of the data available through the Form ADV and its
schedules. Future work could incorporate a richer set of variables based on recent
research (e.g. Clifford et al. (2018) and Cumming, Leung, and Rui (2015b) shows
board characteristics – which are available via Form ADV Schedule A – are related to
hedge fund fraud). Accordingly, in conjunction with writing this handbook chapter,
we have created a publicly available data set that contains the complete set of SEC
Form ADV filings we obtained including the data used in our tests. These data
are available at https://doi.org/10.13023/nsjd-rk62. It is our hope that easier data
access will spur additional research on the topic of fraud by investment managers and
provide investors with important information regarding their choice of investment
manager.
12See https://www.sec.gov/help/foiadocsinvafoiahtm.html for data downloads, or visit
https://www.adviserinfo.sec.gov/IAPD/InvestmentAdviserData.aspx to search for firms.
13Due to data requirements, the study is limited to U.S. based investment advisors. Nevertheless,
the fraud predictors identified in this paper should provide useful information to investors and
regulators in a global setting. However, further research in an international context would be
valuable.
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Table 2.1: Summary of Investment Fraud
This table summarizes cases of investment fraud committed by investment advisors between 1984 and 2016 as reported on SEC
administrative proceedings and litigation releases filed from 2001 to 2016. Registered denotes firms that file a Form ADV with
the SEC. Firm-wide fraud is committed by high level executives, or at the very least, with the firms’ implicit acceptance. Rogue
employee fraud is committed by individuals who evade their firms’ internal control systems and the firms do not knowingly
benefit.
Panel A: Registered versus non-registered advisors
Total Firm-wide Rogue employee Investor losses ($ billions)
Non-registered 342 328 14 6.5
Registered 639 529 110 39.1
Total 981 857 124 45.6
Panel B: Fraud characteristics
Investor losses ($ million) Duration (years)
Obs. Mean Median Max Missing Mean Median Max
Firm-wide 529 93.5 3.2 18,000.0 122 4.2 3 20.8
Rogue employee 110 11.7 1.3 300.0 21 4 3 15
Total 639 78.8 2.7 18,000.0 143 4.1 3 20.8
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Table 2.2: Summary of Fraud Types
This table summarizes the types of investment fraud committed by registered investment advisors between 1984-2016 as reported
on SEC administrative proceedings and litigation releases filed from 2001 to 2016. Direct theft occurs when an investment advisor
directly steals money from a client. Misrepresentation occurs when an advisor makes material misrepresentations to clients.
Self-dealing occurs when an advisor siphons off clients’ money through related party transactions. Overstating assets occurs
when an advisor overstates the amount of assets under management to increase fees. A Ponzi scheme occurs when an advisor
steals clients’ money, and uses new investments to repay old investments. Mutual fund late trading occurs when an advisor
allows some investors to transact shares after a fund’s net asset value has been calculated. The numbers in parentheses exclude
Bernie Madoff’s 2008 Ponzi scheme.
Number of
cases
Percent of total
cases
Investor losses ($
billions)
Percent of total
losses
Average loss per case
($ millions)
Direct theft 212 33.20% 5.21 13.3% (24.7%) 24.56
Misrepresentation 161 25.20% 2.8 7.2% (13.3%) 17.39
Self-dealing 145 22.70% 0.87 2.2% (4.1%) 5.98
Overstate assets 49 7.70% 0.98 2.5% (4.7%) 20.04
Ponzi scheme 37 5.80% 27.5 70.30% 743.24
(36) (5.6%) (9.50) (45.0%) (263.89)
MF late trading 35 5.50% 1.74 4.5% (8.3%) 49.8
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Table 2.3: Summary of Investment Advisory Firms
This table summarizes information from each firm’s first Form ADV filing from 2000
to 2015. There are 24,536 unique firms in the sample. Employee ownership is the
aggregate employee ownership of the firm. Percent client agents is the percentage
of clients that are agents for the owners of the assets. Past fraud equals one if
the firm is identified as committing fraud in a previous SEC filing. Past affiliated
fraud equals one if the firm’s affiliates have been identified as committing fraud in a
previous SEC filing. Past regulatory equals one if the firm reports past regulatory
violations. Past civil or criminal equals one if the firm reports past civil or criminal
violations. Referral fees equals one if the firm compensates any party for client
referrals. Interest in transaction equals one if the firm recommends securities in which
it has an ownership interest, serves as an underwriter, or has any other sales interest.
Soft dollars equals one if the firm receives benefits other than execution from a broker-
dealer in connection with clients’ trades. Broker in firm equals one if the firm employs
registered representatives of a broker-dealer. Investment Company Act equals one if
the firm is registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940. Custody equals
one if the firm has custody of clients’ cash or securities. Dedicated CCO equals one
if the chief compliance officer has no other job title. Hedge fund clients equals one
if more than 75% of the firm’s clients are hedge funds. The column Clean (Fraud)
summarizes firms in which a fraud is not committed (is committed) from first filing
through December 2015. The symbols *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels based on Fisher’s exact test.
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Panel A: Firm characteristics
Mean SD 25th 50th 75th
Employee ownership 62.10% 38.6 15 87.5 92.5
Avg. acct. size ($ thousand) 65,285 610,636 158 895 24,115
Percent client agents 25.70% 34.8 0 10 35
Assets under mgmt. ($ million) 1,307 11,304 3 50 228
Firm age (years) 3.3 5.8 1 1 1
Panel B: Firm disclosures
All Clean Fraud
Past fraud 0.1 0.1 1.3***
Past affiliated fraud 1.10% 1.1 2.6**
Past regulatory 9.80% 9.4 29.6***
Past civil or criminal 2.80% 2.6 11.3***
Referral fees 33.60% 33.2 50.0***
Interest in transaction 28.80% 28.5 46.5***
Soft dollars 51.10% 50.9 56.3**
Broker in firm 50.40% 50.2 60.1***
Investment Company Act 8.90% 8.7 17.2***
Custody 18.20% 18.2 17.9
Dedicated CCO 15.50% 15.6 11.7**
Hedge fund clients 10.70% 10.7 8.3*
58
Table 2.4: Predicting Fraud
The full sample consists of 128,468 firm-year observations. In the first column, the
sample includes only each firm’s first Form ADV filed during the sample period. In
the remaining columns, the independent variables are taken from each firm’s Form
ADV filing for each year from 2000 to 2015. In the second and third columns, the full
sample is included. In the fourth column, the sample excludes firms with a previously
disclosed fraud. In the fifth column, the sample excludes all firms that disclose in
Item 11 of Form ADV any type of prior legal or regulatory violation, either by the
firm itself or an affiliated firm. Refer to Table 2.2 for variable definitions. Column (1)
of Panel A shows the results of a cross-sectional probit regression predicting fraud.
The dependent variable equals one if the firm commits fraud in any subsequent year
through 2015. Standard errors are robust. Columns (2)–(5) show the results of
pooled probit regressions predicting fraud. The dependent variable equals one if the
firm commits fraud in the subsequent year. Standard errors are clustered by firm and
year. In the interest of brevity, the constants are not reported. Standard errors are
reported in square brackets. The symbols *, **, and *** denote significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The columns in Panels B and C correspond to
the columns in Panel A. Panel B shows the proportion of fraud that could be predicted
within-sample. Panel C shows the results from k-fold cross-validation tests.
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Panel A: Predictors of fraud
Cross Section Full sample Full sample No prior fraud No prior violat.
Past fraud 0.213 0.136
[0.28] [0.14]
Past affiliated fraud -0.209 -0.1 -0.099
[0.14] [0.11] [0.12]
Past regulatory 0.318*** 0.321*** 0.323*** 0.329***
[0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05]
Past civil or criminal 0.310*** 0.195*** 0.205*** 0.200***
[0.09] [0.06] [0.06] [0.07]
Referral fees 0.037 0.128*** 0.130*** 0.124** 0.134**
[0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.06]
Interest in transaction 0.239*** 0.316*** 0.317*** 0.319*** 0.361***
[0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.07]
Soft dollars -0.067 -0.025 -0.023 -0.02 -0.013
[0.05] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.05]
Broker in firm 0.203*** 0.083 0.085 0.084 0.033
[0.05] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.08]
ICA of 1940 0.117 0.122 0.126 0.139* 0.156*
[0.07] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.09]
Custody -0.103 -0.071 -0.07 -0.084* -0.114
[0.07] [0.04] [0.04] [0.05] [0.07]
Dedicated CCO -0.048 -0.154*** -0.154*** -0.140** -0.026
[0.08] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06]
Majority emp. owned -0.053 -0.069 -0.075 -0.068 -0.077
[0.05] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07]
Log(avg. acct. size) -0.061*** -0.080*** -0.080*** -0.075*** -0.037**
[0.02] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02]
Percent client agents 0.001 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002**
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Hedge fund clients 0.091 0.162* 0.163* 0.149* 0.153*
[0.10] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.09]
Log(AUM) 0.082*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.059*** 0.009
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
Log(firm age) 0.015 -0.062** -0.062** -0.062** -0.071***
[0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03]
Model chi-square 315.4*** 279.1*** 265.8*** 258.6*** 86.38***
Observations 15,848 128,468 128,468 127,646 102,704
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Panel B: Within-sample predictions
Cross Section Full sample Full sample No prior fraud No prior violat.
# Fraud 389 1,260 1,260 1,224 673
Fraud predicted 111 339 341 321 89
28.50% 26.90% 27.10% 26.20% 13.20%
# Clean firms 15,459 127,208 127,208 126,422 102,031
Clean firm false pos. 772 6,360 6,360 6,321 5,101
5.00% 5.00% 5.00% 5.00% 5.00%
Prop. $ losses avoided 28.80% 28.50% 28.60% 24.10% 13.50%
Panel C: K-fold cross-validation hold-out sample predictions
Cross Section Full sample Full sample No prior fraud No prior violat.
Avg # fraud predicted 104.2 336.25 340.8 317.8 87.7
Avg % fraud predicted 26.80% 26.70% 27.00% 26.00% 13.00%
Stdv # fraud predicted 3.8 2.1 2.1 3.1 3.9
Min # fraud predicted 98 332 336 311 78
Max # fraud predicted 110 339 344 322 93
Avg # false positives 766.9 6,352.00 6,367.70 6,316.80 5,106.70
Avg % false positives 5.00% 5.00% 5.00% 5.00% 5.00%
Stdv false positives 33.2 54.6 69.1 80.8 114.3
Min # false positives 723 6,258 6,266 6,164 4,900
Max # false positives 852 6,482 6,482 6,471 5,288
61
Table 2.5: Initiation versus Continuance of Fraud
The sample consists of 129,465 firm-year observations. The independent variables are
taken from each firm’s Form ADV filings from 2000 through 2015. Panel A shows
the results of a sequential logit regression predicting fraud. The first column shows
estimates of the probability that a firm initiates a fraud in the subsequent year.
The second column shows estimates of the probability that a firm with a preexisting
fraud continues that fraud into the subsequent year. Refer to Table 2.3 for variable
definitions. In the interest of brevity, the constants are not reported. All significance
tests are based on standard errors clustered by firm. Standard errors are reported in
square brackets. The symbols *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels, respectively. Panel B shows the proportion of initiated fraud cases that
could be predicted within-sample.
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Panel A: Predicting initiation versus continuance of fraud
Initiate Continue
Past fraud 0.246 -0.801*
[0.30] [0.47]
Past affiliated fraud -0.292 0.831***
[0.20] [0.29]
Past regulatory 0.803*** 0.046
[0.13] [0.18]
Past civil or criminal 0.474*** -0.328
[0.15] [0.21]
Referral fees 0.374*** -0.266*
[0.12] [0.15]
Interest in transaction 0.821*** 0.047
[0.14] [0.16]
Soft dollars -0.039 0.078
[0.12] [0.14]
Broker in firm 0.258** 0.067
[0.12] [0.17]
Investment Company Act 0.22 -0.183
[0.16] [0.25]
Custody -0.187 0.003
[0.12] [0.18]
Dedicated CCO -0.431*** 0.378**
[0.13] [0.19]
Majority emp. owned -0.207* 0.129
[0.12] [0.17]
Log(avg. acct. size) -0.208*** -0.034
[0.03] [0.04]
Percent client agents 0.005*** 0.007**
[0.00] [0.00]
Hedge fund clients 0.386* 0.389
[0.23] [0.34]
Log(AUM) 0.175*** -0.001
[0.03] [0.04]
Log(firm age) -0.140*** 0.018
[0.05] [0.06]
Model chi-square 352.16*** 291.11***
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Panel B: Within-sample predictions Initiate
# Fraud 228
Fraud predicted 68
29.80%
# Clean firms 129,237
Clean firm false positives 6,411
5.00%
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Table 2.6: Firm-wide versus rogue employee fraud
The sample consists of 129,465 firm-year observations. The independent variables are
taken from each firm’s Form ADV filings from 2000 through 2015. Panel A shows
the results of a multinomial probit regression predicting fraud. In the first column,
the dependent variable equals one for firms that experience a firm-wide fraud in the
subsequent year. In the second column, the dependent variable equals one for firms
that experience a rogue employee fraud in the subsequent year. The excluded category
is clean firms. Refer to Table 2.3 for variable definitions. In the interest of brevity,
the constants are not reported. All significance tests are based on standard errors
clustered by firm. Standard errors are reported in square brackets. The symbols *, **,
and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The columns
in Panel B correspond to the columns in Panel A. Panel B shows the proportion of
fraud that could be predicted within-sample.
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Panel A: Predicting firm wide versus rogue employee fraud
Firm Rogue
Past fraud 0.067 0.363
[0.19] [0.28]
Past affiliated fraud -0.003 -0.063
[0.10] [0.22]
Past regulatory 0.425*** 0.520***
[0.08] [0.15]
Past civil or criminal 0.15 0.433***
[0.09] [0.14]
Referral fees 0.139** 0.215
[0.06] [0.14]
Interest in transaction 0.453*** 0.287*
[0.07] [0.17]
Soft dollars 0.005 -0.08
[0.06] [0.14]
Broker in firm 0.120* 0.252
[0.06] [0.16]
Investment Company Act 0.224** 0.158
[0.09] [0.18]
Custody -0.072 -0.206
[0.07] [0.13]
Dedicated CCO -0.113* -0.154
[0.07] [0.16]
Majority emp. owned -0.023 -0.294*
[0.07] [0.16]
Log(avg. acct. size) -0.080*** -0.192***
[0.02] [0.03]
Percent client agents 0.003*** -0.001
[0.00] [0.00]
Hedge fund clients 0.181 -0.135
[0.12] [0.28]
Log(AUM) 0.049*** 0.205***
[0.02] [0.04]
Log(firm age) -0.099*** 0.068
[0.03] [0.06]
Model chi-square 212.85*** 198.81***
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Panel B: Within-sample predictions Firm Rogue
# Fraud 1,133 249
Fraud predicted 232 154
20.50% 61.80%
# Clean firms 128,332 129,216
Clean firm false positives 6,404 6,404
5.00% 5.00%
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Figure 2.1: Timeline for Fraud Committed by Veros Partners
This figure shows a simplified timeline of a Ponzi fraud committed by Veros Partners. Veros began operations in 2006. In March
2012, Veros initiated a Ponzi scheme in which clients were promised a high guaranteed rate of return for a 12-month investment.
When repayment came due, Veros used the proceeds from new investments to repay outstanding amounts or convinced the
client to “roll over” their investment.
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Figure 2.2: Fraud Cases over Time
This figure shows fraud initiations (darker bars) and ongoing fraud cases (lighter
bars) by calendar year for all detected cases disclosed in the SEC litigation releases
or administrative proceedings for firms in the sample. The beginning and ending dates
for each fraud case is disclosed in the SEC releases. The figure includes only fraud
cases that were ongoing during the 2001-2016 sample period and were committed
by firms filing Form ADV during the sample period. Thus, the reported cases for
1984-2000 include only those fraud cases initiated prior to 2001, but which continued
into the sample period. Fraud cases initiated prior to 2001, but which were detected
or discontinued prior to 2001 are not included.
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Figure 2.3: Model Diagnostic Performance
TThis figure shows the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve for the probit
mode specification from column (3) of Table 2.4. The sample consists of 128,468
firm-year observations. The ROC curve plots the relation between the proportion
of fraud detected and the proportion of false positives for all possible classification
cut-points. The ROC curve is generated by taking each observation’s estimated fraud
probability and computing the sensitivity and specificity using that observation as a
cut-point.
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Figure 2.4: Model Performance over Time
This figure shows model prediction statistics (sensitivity and specificity) by calendar
year. The model uses the coefficient estimates from column (3) of Table 3 of Dimmock
and Gerken (2012), who estimated a prediction model using data from 2001-2006. The
inputs of the model are obtained from Form ADV filings from 2001-2015.
Copyright c© Joseph Farizo, 2020.
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Chapter 3 Mutual Fund Voting Divergence and Performance
3.1 Introduction
Over the past several decades, ownership of US equities has shifted from direct hold-
ings by individual investors to indirect holdings through investment management
companies. As much as 90% of the stock market was held directly at the end of
the World War II; by the year 2000, direct ownership had fallen by more than half
as individuals increasingly held their financial assets in mutual funds and pension
funds.1 Today, these investment companies hold about 31% of the equity market.2
With such large holdings by investment companies, the landscape of corporate
governance has changed. Voting rights attached to common shares are now concen-
trated within a few hundred fund complexes rather than spread across millions of
proxy-voting individuals. This has implications for the outcome of proposals up for a
vote at company meetings. Morgan et al. (2011) demonstrate that the proposals mu-
tual funds support more than other investors3 are more likely to pass. Additionally,
implementation of non-binding shareholder proposals are higher when mutual funds
provide greater support. Thus, how mutual funds govern their portfolio companies is
of particular relevance to the investor.
Mutual funds are bound by their fiduciary duty to cast their votes in a man-
ner consistent with a shareholder’s best interest. Perhaps surprisingly, mutual funds
within the same family can and do cast votes differently on the same proposal. As in
Morgan et al. (2011), I call such within-family voting differences “divergence.” Table
3.1 presents the divergence ratio for several well-known fund families in my sample.
Consider first the largest 5 mutual fund families as of December 2016: BlackRock,
Vanguard, State Street, Fidelity, and JPMorgan. Their divergence ratio on all propos-
als is 3.7%, 0.1%, 5.1%, 9.7%, and 3.6%, respectively, considerable variation among
just the top 5 funds. Put another way, funds within the BlackRock family vote dif-
ferently on the same proposal and average of 3.7% of the time. Funds within the
Vanguard family rarely vote differently on the same proposal: their divergence ratio
is 0.1%. The divergence ratio on contentious management sponsored director elec-
tions, the variation in the divergence ratio is even greater for these otherwise similar
families.
Given that the funds within a family will have access to the same information in
evaluating proposals, it may come as a surprise that funds would ever vote differently.
Further, as Malenko and Shen (2016) demonstrate, many institutional investors rely
on the recommendation of outside proxy advisors who make the same recommen-
dation on how a vote should be cast to all funds within a family. Previous papers,
however, have documented varying levels of cooperation among mutual funds within
1“Households Own More of the Stock Market These Days” The Wall Street Journal. October
3, 2016.
2“2017 Investment Company Fact Book.” The Investment Company Institute. 57th edition.
3International, individual, and hedge funds to name a few.
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a family. Differences in voting patterns among funds within the same complex is
therefore not altogether extraordinary. Evans et al. (2017) show that some families
encourage competition among their individual fund managers while others encourage
cooperation. They find that funds at families that offer incentives to encourage com-
petition have higher average performance. Kempf and Ruenzi (2007) show that funds
within a family adjust their risk based on their performance and size rank within the
family. The authors conclude that funds of a family should be seen as competitors,
rather than as coordinated entities.
Several studies have considered the consequences of opposing management on
fund returns, flows, and business ties. Iliev and Lowry (2014) find a significantly pos-
itive relationship between active voting and fund alphas: funds that more frequently
oppose proxy advisors perform better. Dimmock, Gerken, Ivković, and Weisbenner
(2018c) show that funds more frequently opposing management have greater future
net flows, providing evidence that such active voting behavior is valued by investors.
Davis and Kim (2007) demonstrate that there is a positive relationship between busi-
ness ties (through 401(k) and pension account servicing) and the propensity to vote
with management.
While the consequences of mutual fund voting patterns have been widely studied
in the literature, no paper to my knowledge has considered the relationship between
the divergence ratio and fund performance. The main finding of this paper is that
mutual funds in families with a higher divergence ratio outperform those with a lower
level of divergence. That is, fund families that allow for managers at individual funds
to vote their own shares achieve a statistically significant net alpha between 60 and
104 basis points higher than funds in families with a lower level of divergence.
The conclusion of Iliev and Lowry (2014) holds here: “the types of funds that
invest more resources in voting also differ along other dimensions, perhaps more
diligent picking of stocks, which contribute to higher returns.” Clearly, the divergence
ratio alone cannot explain higher returns of the stocks held by the fund. At the very
least the higher risk-adjusted returns of funds in the top divergence quintile is an
interesting relationship and a previously unobserved phenomenon.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I discuss the
data sources and the sample. Section 3.3 describes in greater detail the calculation of
the divergence measure as well as the regression procedures and multifactor pricing
models. Section 3.4 presents the main results of the study, and Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Data
Summary statistics for the data are presented in Table 3.2. The data comes from
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS- formerly RiskMetrics) and the Center for
Research in Secuirty Prices (CRSP). For performance regressions, factor realizations
are obtained from Ken French’s and Yu Yuan’s websites.
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3.2.1 CRSP
The data on mutual fund characteristics and their returns comes from the CRSP
Survivor-Bias-Free U.S. Mutual Fund database. The focus of this study is on domestic
long-only U.S. equity funds. In order to limit the sample to just these funds, I
drop any that CRSP labels as a variable annuity, index fund, or ETF.4 I identify
any international, sector, balanced, buy-write, enhanced, leveraged, long/short, and
commodity funds based on the CRSP fund name using the list of keywords of Jordan
and Riley (2016). Those funds are then removed from the sample. As in Jordan and
Riley (2016), I require that all funds be at least 2 years old and have at least $20 in
assets under management (AUM) to correct for the incubation bias as identified in
Evans (2010). Once a fund achieves this AUM threshold, it remains in the sample
until it is no longer listed in CRSP. All share classes of a fund within CRSP are
collapsed at the class group identifier. The AUM of the fund is the sum of all assets
in each share class. Other fund characteristics are calculated as a asset weighted
average across share classes.
Panel A of 3.2 presents summary statistics for the sample of mutual funds in
this study. The sample runs from June 2012 to July 2016. There are 1,160 funds
across 116 families, with a median size of $530 million and an average expense ratio
of 1.07%. On average, there are 12 unique funds within a family. The calculation of
a fund family’s divergence requires that a family have at least two funds that meet
the criteria above, so no family has only one fund in sample.
3.2.2 Factor Realizations
In accessing the performance of funds within families of varying divergence ratios, I
use several multifactor pricing models. For these performance regressions, daily factor
realizations of SMB, HML, UMD, RMW, and CMA are obtained from Ken French’s
website.5 Daily factor realizations of SMBS&Y , MGMT, and PERF are obtained
from Yu Yuan’s website.6
3.2.3 ISS Voting Analytics
As of August 31, 2004, all mutual funds and registered management investment com-
panies are required to report how they vote their proxies on equity shares held in the
prior year. These vote records are disclosed on the SEC Form N-PX. Each fund must
file this form with the SEC by the end of August, covering all votes submitted in the
previous N-PX reporting year, from July 1st through June 30th.
The data on these forms is collected and maintained by ISS. Included in the
data are the fund family and mutual fund, type of proposal, a brief description of
the proposal, the company the proposal pertains to, the company management’s
4Index funds and ETFs are included in the calculation of a fund family’s divergence. Performance
regressions will not include index or passive funds and ETFs.
5http : //mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/datalibrary.html
6http : //www.saif.sjtu.edu.cn/facultylist/yyuan/
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recommendation, who proposed the vote (shareholder or management), and how each
fund voted.
ISS is the largest proxy advisory firm, covering nearly 40,000 meetings in 117
markets and executing 8.5 million proxy ballots for its 1700 institutional clients.
The data includes ISS’s recommendation for each proposal on the ballot of all Russell
3000 companies, which is provided to each of its institutional clients. The importance
of these recommendations is well documented in the literature. Malenko and Shen
(2016) find that a negative ISS recommendation on say-on-pay proposals leads to
a 25 percentage point reduction in support. Morgan et al. (2011) find that an ISS
recommendation in favor of a proposal increases the probability a fund will vote in
favor of that proposal by 43.6%.
Panel C of Table 3.2 summarizes the voting data. The funds vote on over 38 mil-
lion items, nearly 26 million of which are management sponsored director elections
(MSDEs). Funds cast a vote in favor of the proposal on the ballot some 91.6% of the
time and in favor of MSDEs 93.3% of the time. The approval rate on the 3.7 million
contentious proposals in the sample is significantly lower at 45%. Contentious man-
agement sponsored director elections (cMSDEs), where ISS opposes management’s
voting recommendation, are approved by the funds in sample only about half of the
time.
There is no unique identifier that maps the ISS and CRSP databases. In order to
link fund characteristics, family characteristics, and fund performance data of CRSP
to the divergence ratio obtained from ISS, I match based on the family name. Each
record is checked for accuracy. I allow any family that is acquired to be stand-alone
in the years up until acquisition, at which point the family’s funds are subsumed by
the acquiring family.
3.3 Methodology
3.3.1 The Divergence Measure
The divergence measure is calculated at the family-year level. For each year, I divide
the number of times funds within a family vote differently on the same proposal by
the number of proposals that a family has the opportunity to vote on more than once.
For family i in N-PX year t :
Divergencei,t =
# Proposals V oted Differentlyi,t
# Overlapping Proposalsi,t
(3.1)
This measure is calculated for all 116 families that map from the CRSP to ISS
database for all years in which data is available. In calculating divergence, I al-
low all index and passively managed funds to remain within the sample. If Fidelity
votes one way on a proposal for a company held in its active Magellan Fund and
another way on that same proposal in its passive Spartan S&P 500 fund, such a vote
would be included in that year’s divergence calculation.
The primary analysis of this paper will use the divergence ratio on cMSDE propos-
als. For both the numerator and denominator, only those votes that are contentious
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management-sponsored director elections will be tallied. This limits the sample to
those votes where opposing management is potentially value increasing, as in Dim-
mock et al. (2018c).
3.3.2 Regression Procedure
I follow a procedure similar to Iliev and Lowry (2014) and Jordan and Riley (2016)
in evaluating the performance of the funds. On the left hand side will be either
the equally weighted-average net-of-fee or gross-of-fee returns across all mutual funds
on a day within the sample, less the risk-free rate. The regressions all have 1,133
observations corresponding to the number of trading days from the end of N-PX year
2012 to the end of N-PX year 2016, with the average return on the left and the factors
on the right. The intercept of these regressions is the alpha that would be obtained
by holding an equally-weighted portfolio of all mutual funds across the sample period,
rebalanced at the beginning of each N-PX year.
For each of the factor models, I regress the average daily return of a portfolio of
funds formed on the previous year’s divergence. Funds are sorted into quintiles based
on their family’s prior N-PX year cMSDE divergence ratio. The top quintile includes
those funds in a family-year with the highest divergence ratio; the bottom quintile
includes funds in a family-year with the lowest divergence ratio. In differencing
columns, I subtract the average daily returns from the top and bottom quintile funds
for each day and then regress this difference on the factors.
I consider several factor models in assessing performance, each of which are dis-
cussed in greater detail below.7 These models are the Capital Asset Pricing Model
(CAPM), the Fama-French and Carhart four-factor model, a six-factor model includ-
ing investment and profitability factors, the Stambaugh and Yuan (2017) mispricing
factor model and the four- and six-factor models supplemented with the size premium
as calculated in Stambaugh and Yuan (2017). I consider each of these models as ro-
bustness checks to ensure that any perceived over- or under-performance (positive or
negative alpha) is not a result of an inadequate pricing model. For example, earlier
studies tend to use the CAPM to calculate alpha. Later studies, such as Carhart
(1997), Fama and French (1993), and Fama and French (2015) demonstrate that
what was previously perceived as alpha as calculated by the CAPM may actually
be explained by common factors in stock returns. Cremers, Petajisto, and Zitzewitz
(2012) show that even the four-factor model can have biased alphas because the inter-
cept term in the four-factor regressions is non-zero for index and passively managed
funds. Regardless, the four-factor model is perhaps the most commonly used model
in the evaluation of mutual fund alphas.
3.3.3 The Capital Asset Pricing Model
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), which relates the expected return of a
risky asset to the systematic risk of the market, arose from the seminal, independent,
7See Jordan and Riley (2016) for further discussion on these models
76
and contemporaneous works of Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and Mossin (1966).
The model is presented as:
E(Ri) −Rf = βi(E(RM) −Rf ) + αi (3.2)
where E(Ri) is the expected return of asset i, Rf is the risk-free rate,
8 and E(RM) is
the return of the value-weighted market portfolio of risky assets. E(RM)−Rf , then,
represents the “market risk premium”, or the excess return of the market portfolio
over the risk-free rate. Alpha, α, is the abnormal rate of return above or below which
the model predicts. The key measure in this model is βi (beta) which represents the
systematic, or non-diversifiable, risk.
3.3.4 The Four-Factor Model
Fama and French (1992) demonstrate that the relationship between beta and ex-
pected returns practically disappears from 1963-1990. Their tests do not support
the simple intuition of the CAPM, that average stock returns are related to market
betas. However, the addition of two factors that capture the effects of asset size and
value capture the cross-sectional variation of stock returns. These findings led to the
development of the size and value factors SMB and HML in Fama and French (1993).
As discussed in Jordan and Riley (2016), Carhart (1997) supplements the new Fama
and French (1992) three-factor model with a momentum pricing factor (UMD) mo-
tivated by the findings of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). This results in the widely
used four-factor model:
E(Ri)−Rf = βi1(E(RM)−Rf ) +βi2(SMB) +βi3(HML) +βi4(UMD) +αi (3.3)
Carhart (1997) shows that by using this model to control for common factors of size,
value, and persistence in stock returns, the misattributed risk-adjusted performance
of the CAPM is eliminated.
3.3.5 The Six-Factor Model
Additional works have introduced new factors that seek to further explain the cross
section of expected returns. Fama and French (2015) construct factors that capture
the effects of profitability (RMW) and capital investments (CMA). Jordan and Riley
(2016) find that the addition of these RMW and CMA factors to the four-factor
model reveals that mutual fund managers have risk-adjusted skill, and as many as
15% of mutual fund managers have persistent skill in excess of the fees they charge
their clients. The six-factor model is:
E(Ri) −Rf = βi1(E(RM) −Rf ) + βi2(SMB) + βi3(HML)+
+ βi4(UMD) + βi5(RMW ) + βi6(CMA) + αi (3.4)
8The return on a 90-day US Treasury bill is generally used as a proxy for the risk-free rate of
return.
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3.3.6 The Stambaugh & Yuan Mispricing Factors Model
The above factor models have generally followed a simple pattern: add a factor for
each new pricing anomaly that is uncovered empirically. In a departure from this
simple procedure, Stambaugh and Yuan (2017) develop two new “mispricing” fac-
tors used in addition to the market factor beta and a newly-calculated SMB factor.9
These two new factors, MGMT and PERF each capture several anomalies each. The
MGMT factor includes six anomalies uncovered in the literature: net stock issues,
composite equity issues, accruals, net operating assets, asset growth, and investment
to assets. These factors can be more or less directly impacted by firm’s management.
The PERF factor includes five anomalies: distress, O-score, momentum, gross prof-
itability, and return on assets. These factors are related to performance. This model
is presented as:
E(Ri)−Rf = βi1(E(RM)−Rf )+βi2(SMBS&Y )+βi3(MGMT )+βi4(PERF )+αi
(3.5)
Additionally, I consider the SMBS&Y factor within the context of the 4- and 6-factor
models of Fama and French (1993), Carhart (1997), and Fama and French (2015) to
determine if the calculated alphas are sensitive to the size factor employed. These
supplemented models are:
E(Ri) −Rf = βi1(E(RM) −Rf ) + βi2(SMBS&Y ) + βi3(HML)+
+ βi4(UMD) + +αi (3.6)
and
E(Ri) −Rf = βi1(E(RM) −Rf ) + βi2(SMBS&Y ) + βi3(HML)+
+ βi4(UMD) + βi5(RMW ) + βi6(CMA) + αi (3.7)
3.4 Results
In this section, I run the regressions as discussed in the previous subsections and
Equations 3.2 through 3.7, from the Capital Asset Pricing Model to the Stambaugh
& Yuan mispricing factors model. In all cases, the alphas are annualized and reported
in percent.
3.4.1 The CAPM and Four Factor Models
Table 3.3 presents the regression results for the CAPM and four-factor models for both
net and gross returns. Consider first the net regressions of Panel A. The results in
9The Stambaugh & Yuan size premium SMBS&Y , unlike the Fama & French size premium, is
calculated using only those stocks that are least likely to be mispriced. Across all 1,113 days in my
sample, the correlation between SMB and SMBS&Y is approximately 0.87.
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Columns (1) and (2) indicate that both the top and bottom quintile funds, as sorted
based on their prior N-PX year’s cMSDE divergence ratio, achieve a statistically
significant and negative alpha. The test for differences between these alphas is shown
to be statistically significant in Column (3) at the 5% level. That is, holding a
portfolio of funds within a family in the top-quintile of the past N-PX year divergence
ratio will deliver a CAPM alpha 1.04% greater than a portfolio of funds within a
family in the bottom-quintile. Upon the inclusion of the SMB, HML, and UMD
factors, some of the under-performance is “explained away” by common factors: the
alphas drop in magnitude yet maintain their negative sign and statistical significance.
The differences in the loading on the SMB is the greatest, with top quintile funds
having a significantly lower small cap exposure.
The gross regressions presented in Panel B show that alphas are generally in-
distinguishable from zero before fees, results that mirror Fama and French (2010)
and Jordan and Riley (2016). Additionally, as Fama and French (2010) argue, gross
returns are better when evaluating skill because the varitaion in the expense ratios
charged by funds has little effect on the ability to deliver alpha. In spite of the lack
of significant alpha in gross returns, the difference in alpha between the top and bot-
tom quintiles for both the CAPM and four-factor models is positive with meaningful
magnitude.
3.4.2 The Six-Factor Model
The inclusion of the Fama and French (2015) firm profitability and investment factors,
RMW and CMA, to the traditional four-factor model provides an additional test.
Table 3.4 presents these results. As in Jordan and Riley (2016), the addition of
RMW and CMA reduces the magnitude of the net and gross alphas relative to the
four-factor model. Notice also that the magnitude and significance falls for the value
factor HML, which is found to be redundant for describing average returns in the
sample examined in Fama and French (2015).
While the magnitudes for alphas fall with the inclusion of these factors, the con-
clusion that top quintile funds outperform bottom quintile funds does not change.
The difference in alphas between the top and bottom quintile funds is positive and
significant for the net regressions in Panel A. In Panel B, the difference in gross al-
phas is insignificant but still positive with a sizable magnitude of 54 basis points.
Consistent with prior research, average mutual fund alphas are zero before expenses
and negative upon reducing returns by the expense ratio.
3.4.3 The Stambaugh & Yuan Model
I now abandon the traditional “x minus y” factors of Fama and French (2015) and
Carhart (1997), instead considering the mispricing factors of Stambaugh and Yuan
(2017). The mispricing factors PERF and MGMT, coupled with beta and the re-
calculated SMB factor, are shown to better explain the cross-section of returns in
Stambaugh and Yuan (2017) by reducing the magnitude and significance of alpha.
Table 3.5 tests if my previous CAPM, four-factor, and six-factor results are robust to
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this model. The net regressions of Panel A show that the negative alpha remains sta-
tistically significant at the 99% level for both the top and bottom quintile funds. The
difference in alpha between the top and bottom quintile funds remains statistically
significant, with a meaningful magnitude of 75 basis points.
The difference between the top and bottom quintiles is also the same for the gross
return regression in Panel B. Here again, the alpha in the top and bottom quintile
funds is either insignificant or marginally significant. Regardless, the difference of 69
basis points between the alphas is determined by the t-test to be greater than zero.
In both the net and gross regressions for the Stambaugh & Yuan model, the differ-
ence in the SMB factor is the largest among the factors. Funds in the bottom quintile
have greater exposure to small stocks. The SMB of Stambaugh and Yuan (2017) is
calculated using only those stocks that are determined by their models to be least
likely mispriced. Nonetheless, the loadings on this size factor are similar in magni-
tude and significance to the traditional four- and six- factor models. Likewise, the
difference on the loading between top and bottom quintile funds is virtual identical
across models. Top quintile funds also have less exposure to the performance anoma-
lies captured by PERF and greater exposure to the management anomalies capture
by MGMT, but these differences are quite small despite their statistical significance.
3.4.4 The Stambaugh & Yuan Four- and Six- Factor Models
As a final test, I consider the SMB factor as constructed in Stambaugh and Yuan
(2017) as a supplement to the traditional four- and six- factor models. These results
are presented in Table 3.6. Panel A (Panel B) provides the net (gross) estimates
for the four- and six- factor model. Relative to the traditional models of Tables 3.4
and 3.5, the alphas and differences in alphas increase in magnitude slightly. Panel B
shows that the gross alphas in the four factor regression are now significantly negative
for the four-factor model. This indicates that mispriced stocks in the calculation of
the Fama-French SMB factor lead to the conclusion that funds on average provide
no risk-adjusted return when in fact the risk-adjusted return is negative. Otherwise,
the magnitude of the loading on the size factor is similar to the traditional models.
3.4.5 Summary of Results
Table 3.7 presents the differencing columns from the previous four tables. Panel A
(Panel B) shows that for net (gross) returns in all models, the alpha is higher for
the top quintile of funds than the bottom quintile of funds. For the net regressions
of Panel A, the magnitude of the difference in alpha varies from 0.60% to 1.04%.
In all cases, the difference is statistically significant and positive: an investor can
achieve between 60 and 104 additional basis points of risk-adjusted return by holding
a portfolio of funds with higher past divergence ratios. From the previous four tables,
however, it is clear that the risk-adjusted performance is not positive, regardless of
which portfolio is held.
The results are somewhat abated for the gross regressions presented in Panel B.
While the differences in alpha for all models is positive, the level of significance is gen-
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erally lower, and some differences are insignificant. The generally smaller magnitude
of the differences relative to the net returns highlights the effect that the variation in
expense ratios has on the results.
3.5 Conclusion
Funds allowed to vote at the fund level perform better than funds at families who
assign the voting decision to member funds. Alphas are 60 to 104 basis points higher
for funds with the highest divergence ratio- a measure that captures voting disparity
within a family. The divergence ratio is uncorrelated with size and the expense ratio,
as well as the number of active and index funds within the family.
The performance results are stronger for net returns than gross returns. Addi-
tionally, the average net alpha is consistently negative, regardless of the divergence
quintile. No significantly positive risk-adjusted returns are realized for any portfolio
of funds based on the divergence ratio. Consistent with prior literature, the gross
alphas are frequently indistinguishable from zero. The results provide evidence of
competition within fund families as identified in Kempf and Ruenzi (2007). These
findings are also consistent with the separating equilibirium of Evans et al. (2017),
who find that managers of competitive fund families have higher average performance.
There is no direct link between the divergence ratio of fund families and the
performance of the shares their mutual funds hold. Further, funds within a family
submitting opposing votes on the same proposal cannot both be making the op-
timal voting choice. The divergence ratio therefore proxies for active engagement
in corporate governance at the fund level and reveals whether the family encourages
competition or coordination among its member funds. Consistent with prior research,
such active involvement in the governing of portfolio companies has benefits, realized
through higher risk-adjusted returns.
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Table 3.1: Divergence Ratios
This table presents divergence ratios for a group of the 116 mutual fund families in the
2012 through 2016 N-PX reporting periods that make up the sample. The divergence
ratio is the number of times within an N-PX year that funds within a family vote
differently on a proposal divided by the number of times funds within a family vote
on the same item. The first two columns present the divergence ratio for all items
voted on by a family, as well as each family’s average number of overlapping votes
per N-PX year. The next two columns present the same, but only for contentious
management sponsored director elections (cMSDEs), where contentious is defined as
ISS submitting a recommendation different than management’s recommendation.
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All Proposals Contentious MSDE Proposals
Divergence # Overlapping Divergence # Overlapping
AIG SunAmerica 5.9% 14,793 12.5% 559
AIM Invesco 5.4% 10,006 16.0% 295
Allianz Global Investors 14.3% 13,562 49.6% 484
American Beacon Advisors 5.7% 2,641 19.4% 67
Blackrock 3.7% 24,132 6.3% 1,341
Bank of New York Mellon 0.0% 2,940 0.0% 66
Charles Schwab 0.1% 22,900 0.1% 1,230
Columbia 0.0% 10,518 0.2% 308
Deutsche DWS Scudder 0.1% 6,441 0.3% 214
Dimensional Fund Advisors 3.8% 18,651 13.3% 1,017
Dreyfus 1.0% 7,002 0.5% 191
Fidelity 9.7% 25,720 46.8% 1,543
GE Asset Management 4.7% 9,872 28.2% 285
Goldman Sachs 4.2% 9,835 13.5% 375
Hartford Mutual Funds 3.4% 8,519 7.4% 312
HSBC 0.0% 1,023 0.0% 34
ING Voya 2.1% 17,282 3.0% 724
Janus Capital Management 5.9% 6,998 11.3% 195
John Hancock 8.5% 19,559 36.7% 991
JPMorgan Funds 3.6% 14,924 10.3% 573
Legg Mason 8.3% 6,705 47.2% 183
Morgan Stanley 0.0% 5,326 0.0% 156
Nationwide Gartmore 10.7% 17,560 42.8% 947
Oppenheimer Funds 0.3% 5,753 0.1% 174
State Street 5.1% 21,155 4.0% 1,082
T. Rowe Price Associates Inc 0.6% 16,349 3.1% 635
TIAA-CREF 0.1% 24,667 0.4% 1,443
Transamerica 9.0% 8,952 41.1% 281
UBS 4.2% 2,093 26.0% 49
USAA 4.9% 12,411 51.0% 481
Vanguard Group Inc 0.1% 25,419 0.5% 1,515
Wells Fargo 0.3% 9,410 0.5% 241
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics
This table presents descriptive statistics on the funds (Panel A), the divergence ratio
(Panel B), and the voting sample (Panel C). The divergence ratio is the number of
times within an N-PX year that funds within a family vote differently on a proposal
divided by the number of times funds within a family vote on the same item. Con-
tentious MSDEs (cMSDEs) are management sponsored director elections where ISS
recommends a vote against the director up for election. Diverg., cMSDE is the di-
vergence ratio as calculated by considering only contentious management sponsored
director election proposals in the vote count. TNA is the total net assets of the fund
family in a year. Exp. Ratio is the weighted average expense ratio of all funds in the
family-year. # Funds, # Active, and # Index are the number of total, active, and
passive funds within a family-year.
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Panel A: Funds
Unique Funds 1,160
Unique Families 116
Mean Median Min Max
TNA (millions) 2,065 530 1 111,797
Exp. Ratio (%) 1.06 1.07 0.12 2.44
Unique Funds per Family 12 9 2 91
Panel B: Divergence
Mean Median Min Max
Overall Divergence (%) 3.35 0.7 0 29.24
Contentious MSDEs Divergence (%) 13.48 4.91 0 60.64
Panel C: Voting
n Approval Rate
Proposals 38,154,945 91.60%
Management Sponsored Proposals 25,914,529 93.33%
Contentious Proposals 3,707,756 44.99%
Contentious MSDE Proposals 1,467,327 50.74%
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Table 3.3: CAPM and Four-Factor Models
This table shows the average risk-adjusted performance of an equally weighted port-
folio of mutual funds formed on each day from June 2012 to July 2016. The CAPM
and four-factor models are presented in equations 3.2 and 3.3. Alpha is annualized
and reported in percent. The dependent variable is the average equally-weighted mu-
tual fund return for a calendar day. Panel A (Panel B) displays the results when the
dependent variable is net (gross) of fees. Columns (1), (2), (4) and (5) in each panel
is for the sample of top and bottom quintile funds, respectively, as ranked by their
previous N-PX year cMSDE divergence ratio. Columns (3) and (6) test for differences
between the top and bottom quintile portfolios. Robust standard errors are used to
calculate the t-statistics presented in brackets below coefficient estimates. ***, **,
and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Panel A: CAPM and Four Factor Regressions, Net
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Top Quintile Bottom Quintile Top-Bottom Top Quintile Bottom Quintile Top-Bottom
Beta 1.06*** 1.06*** -0.00* 1.02*** 1.01*** 0.01***
[181.54] [141.00] [-1.68] [270.69] [220.61] [6.52]
SMB 0.20*** 0.29*** -0.09***
[34.94] [40.18] [-20.25]
HML -0.01 -0.02** 0.01**
[-1.07] [-2.01] [2.58]
UMD 0.01 -0.00 0.01***
[1.12] [-0.50] [3.08]
Alpha -2.43*** -3.48*** 1.04** -1.62*** -2.23*** 0.60*
[-2.66] [-2.74] [2.12] [-2.86] [-3.13] [1.65]
Observations 1,133 1,133 1,133 1,133 1,133 1,133
R-squared 0.987 0.976 0.004 0.995 0.993 0.453
Panel B: CAPM and Four Factor Regressions, Gross
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Top Quintile Bottom Quintile Top-Bottom Top Quintile Bottom Quintile Top-Bottom
Beta 1.06*** 1.06*** -0.00* 1.02*** 1.01*** 0.01***
[181.55] [141.00] [-1.68] [270.71] [220.63] [6.52]
SMB 0.20*** 0.29*** -0.09***
[34.94] [40.19] [-20.24]
HML -0.01 -0.02** 0.01***
[-1.06] [-2.01] [2.58]
UMD 0.01 0.00 0.01***
[1.12] [-0.50] [3.08]
Alpha -1.38 -2.37* 0.99** -0.57 -1.12 0.55
[-1.51] [-1.87] [2.01] [-1.00] [-1.57] [1.50]
Observations 1,133 1,133 1,133 1,133 1,133 1,133
R-squared 0.987 0.976 0.004 0.995 0.993 0.453
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Table 3.4: Six-Factor Model
This table shows the average risk-adjusted performance of an equally weighted port-
folio of mutual funds formed on each day from June 2012 to July 2016. The Six
Factor model is presented in equation 3.4. Alpha is annualized and reported in per-
cent. The dependent variable is the average equally-weighted mutual fund return for
a calendar day. Panel A (Panel B) displays the results when the dependent variable
is net (gross) of fees. Columns (1) and (2) in each panel is for the sample of top and
bottom quintile funds, respectively, as ranked by their previous N-PX year cMSDE
divergence ratio. Column (3) tests for differences between the top and bottom quin-
tile portfolios. Robust standard errors are used to calculate the t-statistics presented
in brackets below coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Six Factor Regressions, Net
(1) (2) (3)
Top Quintile Bottom Quintile Top-Bottom
Beta 1.02*** 1.00*** 0.01***
[253.58] [209.47] [6.02]
SMB 0.19*** 0.28*** -0.09***
[31.87] [37.90] [-19.11]
HML 0.00 0.01 0.00
[0.13] [0.49] [-0.80]
UMD 0.01 0.00 0.01**
[1.13] [-0.14] [2.24]
CMA -0.05*** -0.08*** 0.03***
[-3.59] [-4.44] [3.26]
RMW -0.04*** -0.02 -0.02***
[-3.76] [-1.62] [-2.78]
Alpha -1.55*** -2.15*** 0.60*
[-2.78] [-3.07] [1.65]
Observations 1,133 1,133 1,133
R-squared 0.995 0.993 0.464
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Panel B: Six Factor Regressions, Gross
(1) (2) (3)
Top Quintile Bottom Quintile Top-Bottom
Beta 1.02*** 1.00*** 0.01***
[253.63] [209.49] [6.03]
SMB 0.19*** 0.28*** -0.09***
[31.86] [37.90] [-19.11]
HML 0.00 0.01 0.00
[0.13] [0.49] [-0.80]
UMD 0.01 0.00 0.01**
[1.13] [-0.14] [2.24]
CMA -0.05*** -0.08*** 0.03***
[-3.58] [-4.44] [3.27]
RMW -0.04*** -0.02 -0.02***
[-3.76] [-1.62] [-2.78]
Alpha -0.49 -1.04 0.54
[-0.89] [-1.48] [1.49]
Observations 1,133 1,133 1,133
R-squared 0.995 0.993 0.464
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Table 3.5: Stambaugh & Yuan Model
This table shows the average risk-adjusted performance of an equally weighted portfo-
lio of mutual funds formed on each day from June 2012 to July 2016. The Stambaugh
& Yuan model is presented in equation 3.5. Alpha is annualized and reported in per-
cent. The dependent variable is the average equally-weighted mutual fund re- turn for
a calendar day. Panel A (Panel B) displays the results when the dependent variable
is net (gross) of fees. Columns (1) and (2) in each panel is for the sample of top and
bottom quintile funds, respectively, as ranked by their previous N-PX year cMSDE
divergence ratio. Column (3) tests for differences between the top and bottom quin-
tile portfolios. Robust standard errors are used to calculate the t-statistics presented
in brackets below coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Stambaugh & Yuan Regressions, Net
(1) (2) (3)
Top Quintile Bottom Quintile Top-Bottom
Beta 1.01*** 0.99*** 0.02***
[259.50] [201.52] [7.16]
SMBSY 0.18*** 0.27*** -0.09***
[31.44] [37.74] [-19.49]
PERF 0.01 0.01** -0.01***
[1.60] [2.57] [-2.66]
MGMT -0.08*** -0.10*** 0.03***
[-9.66] [-10.19] [5.45]
Alpha -1.58*** -2.34*** 0.75**
[-2.81] [-3.23] [1.99]
Observations 1,133 1,133 1,133
R-squared 0.995 0.992 0.420
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Panel B: Stambaugh & Yuan Regressions, Gross
(1) (2) (3)
Top Quintile Bottom Quintile Top-Bottom
Beta 1.01*** 0.99*** 0.02***
[259.52] [201.53] [7.16]
SMBSY 0.18*** 0.27*** -0.09***
[31.43] [37.74] [-19.49]
PERF 0.01 0.01** -0.01***
[1.60] [2.57] [-2.67]
MGMT -0.08*** -0.10*** 0.03***
[-9.66] [-10.19] [5.44]
Alpha -0.54 -1.23* 0.69*
[-0.96] [-1.70] [1.85]
Observations 1,133 1,133 1,133
R-squared 0.995 0.992 0.42
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Table 3.6: Stambaugh & Yuan Four- and Six-Factor Models
This table shows the average risk-adjusted performance of an equally weighted portfo-
lio of mutual funds formed on each day from June 2012 to July 2016. The Stambaugh
& Yuan Four- and Six-Factor models are presented in equation 3.6 and 3.7. Alpha is
annualized and reported in percent. The dependent variable is the average equally-
weighted mutual fund return for a calendar day. Panel A (Panel B) displays the
results when the dependent variable is net (gross) of fees. Columns (1), (2), (4) and
(5) in each panel is for the sample of top and bottom quintile funds as ranked by
their previous N-PX year cMSDE divergence ratio. Columns (3) and (6) test for dif-
ferences between the top and bottom quintile portfolios. Robust standard errors are
used to calculate the t-statistics presented in brackets below coefficient estimates.***,
**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Panel A: Stambaugh & Yuan 4- and 6-Factor Regressions, Net
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Top Quintile Bottom Quintile Top-Bottom Top Quintile Bottom Quintile Top-Bottom
Beta 1.02*** 1.01*** 0.01*** 1.01*** 0.99*** 0.02***
[259.88] [202.41] [6.98] [242.91] [190.84] [7.08]
SMBSY 0.19*** 0.28*** -0.09*** 0.18*** 0.26*** -0.08***
[31.15] [34.64] [-18.76] [28.15] [32.81] [-17.92]
HML -0.04*** -0.07*** 0.03*** -0.04*** -0.06*** 0.02***
[-5.51] [-7.14] [5.93] [-4.42] [-4.75] [2.83]
UMD 0 -0.02** 0.01*** -0.00 -0.02*** 0.01***
[-0.49] [-2.46] [4.43] [-0.87] [-2.66] [4.01]
CMA -0.03** -0.06*** 0.02**
[-2.19] [-2.81] [2.39]
RMW -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.00
[-6.82] [-5.11] [-0.24]
Alpha -2.07*** -2.87*** 0.80** -1.92*** -2.71*** 0.78***
[-3.42] [-3.72] [2.12] [-3.29] [-3.60] [2.08]
Observations 1,133 1,133 1,133 1,133 1,133 1,133
R-squared 0.995 0.991 0.42 0.995 0.992 0.425
Panel B: Stambaugh & Yuan 4- and 6- Factor Regressions, Gross
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Top Quintile Bottom Quintile Top-Bottom Top Quintile Bottom Quintile Top-Bottom
Beta 1.02*** 1.01*** 0.01*** 1.01*** 0.99*** 0.02***
[259.89] [202.42] [6.98] [242.96] [190.86] [7.08]
SMBSY 0.19*** 0.28*** -0.09*** 0.18*** 0.26*** -0.08***
[31.14] [34.64] [-18.76] [28.15] [32.82] [-17.92]
HML -0.04*** -0.07*** 0.03*** -0.04*** -0.06*** 0.02***
[-5.51] [-7.14] [5.93] [-4.42] [-4.75] [2.82]
UMD -0.00 -0.02** 0.01*** -0.00 -0.02*** 0.01***
[-0.49] [-2.46] [4.43] [-0.88] [-2.66] [4.01]
CMA -0.03** -0.06*** 0.02**
[-2.19] [-2.81] [2.39]
RMW -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.00
[-6.81] [-5.11] [-0.23]
Alpha -1.01* -1.76** 0.74** -0.87 -1.60** 0.73*
[-1.67] [-2.28] [1.97] [-1.49] [-2.12] [1.93]
Observations 1,133 1,133 1,133 1,133 1,133 1,133
R-squared 0.995 0.991 0.42 0.995 0.992 0.425
93
Table 3.7: Differencing Columns
This table presents the differencing columns from the six pricing models presented in
the previous four tables. Panel A (Panel B) displays the results when the dependent
variable is net (gross) of fees. The alpha in each column is the additional alpha
achieved by funds in the top quintile over funds in the bottom quintile as ranked
by the previous year’s cMSDE divergence ratio. Robust standard errors are used to
calculate the t-statistics presented in brackets below coefficient estimates. ***, **,
and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Differencing Columns for Net Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CAPM Four Factor Six Factor S&Y S&Y 4 Factor S&Y 6 Factor
Beta -0.00* 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.02***
[-1.68] [6.52] [6.02] [7.16] [6.98] [7.08]
SMB -0.09*** -0.09***
[-20.25] [-19.11]
HML 0.01** -0.00 0.03*** 0.02***
[2.58] [-0.80] [5.93] [2.83]
UMD 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***
[3.08] [2.24] [4.43] [4.01]
CMA 0.03*** 0.02**
[3.26] [2.39]
RMW -0.02*** -0.00
[-2.78] [-0.24]
SMBSY -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.08***
[-19.49] [-18.76] [-17.92]
PERF -0.01***
[-2.66]
MGMT 0.03***
[5.45]
Alpha 1.04** 0.60* 0.60* 0.75** 0.80** 0.78**
[2.12] [1.65] [1.65] [1.99] [2.12] [2.08]
Observations 1,133 1,133 1,133 1,133 1,133 1,133
R-squared 0.004 0.453 0.464 0.420 0.420 0.425
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Panel B: Differencing Columns for Gross Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CAPM Four Factor Six Factor S&Y S&Y 4 Factor S&Y 6 Factor
Beta -0.00* 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.02***
[-1.68] [6.52] [6.03] [7.16] [6.98] [7.08]
SMB -0.09*** -0.09***
[-20.24] [-19.11]
HML 0.01** -0.00 0.03*** 0.02***
[2.58] [-0.80] [5.93] [2.82]
UMD 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***
[3.08] [2.24] [4.43] [4.01]
CMA 0.03*** 0.02**
[3.27] [2.39]
RMW -0.02*** -0.00
[-2.78] [-0.23]
SMBSY -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.08***
[-19.49] [-18.76] [-17.92]
PERF -0.01***
[-2.67]
MGMT 0.03***
[5.44]
Alpha 0.99** 0.55 0.54 0.69* 0.74* 0.73*
[2.01] [1.50] [1.49] [1.85] [1.97] [1.93]
Observations 1,133 1,133 1,133 1,133 1,133 1,133
R-squared 0.004 0.453 0.464 0.420 0.420 0.425
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions for Chapter 1
Family Does Not Hold
Actively
An indicator variable with a value of 1 if a pro-
posal is voted on only by index funds within an
institutional fund family and a value of 0 if a pro-
posal is voted on by both index funds and active
funds within an institutional fund family.
Institutional Shareholder Services Vot-
ing Analytics Database
Family Holds in Index
& Active
A firm an index fund votes on that is held by both
index funds and active funds within its institu-
tional fund family.
Institutional Shareholder Services Vot-
ing Analytics Database
Contentious An indicator variable with a value of 1 if Insti-
tutional Shareholder Services recommends a vote
against management’s recommendation for that
proposal, and 0 otherwise.
Institutional Shareholder Services Vot-
ing Analytics Database
Market Value The logarithm of the firm’s previous quarter mar-
ket value.
Compustat Daily Updates-
Fundamentals Quarterly variable
mkvaltq.
Book Assets The logarithm of the firm’s previous quarter book
assets.
Compustat Daily Updates-
Fundamentals Quarterly variable
atq.
ROA The firm’s previous quarter net income divided by
the firm’s previous quarter total assets.
Compustat Daily Updates-
Fundamentals Quarterly variable
niq divided by atq.
Book to Market The firm’s previous quarter Book to Market ratio,
calculated as the book value of stockholders’ equity
divided by market value.
Compustat Daily Updates-
Fundamentals Quarterly variable
teqq divided by mkvaltq.
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Leverage The firm’s previous quarter total long-term debt
divided by the firm’s previous quarter market
value.
Compustat Daily Updates-
Fundamentals Quarterly variable
dlttq divided by mktvaltq.
Excess Return The firm’s three-month return prior to the share-
holder election minus the value weighted market
return over the same period.
CRSP Monthly Stock File variable ret
minus vwretd.
Director Elections Management sponsored proposals to elect mem-
bers to the board of directors.
Institutional Shareholder Services Vot-
ing Analytics Agenda ID 201
Compensation Management sponsored proposals regarding exec-
utive pay, bonuses, and incentive plans.
Institutional Shareholder Services Vot-
ing Analytics Agenda IDs 219-220, 501,
503, 506-507, 509-510, 512, 514, 516,
522, 524-526, 528, 530, 534-535, 537-
538, 541, 547-550, 552, 554-556, 558-
559, 564-566, 568, 570, 581, 588, 592-
593, and 595-599.
Accounting Management sponsored proposals regarding audi-
tors and financial statements.
Institutional Shareholder Services Vot-
ing Analytics Agenda IDs 101, 104-105,
109, 136, 155, 173, and 280.
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General Management sponsored proposals regarding gen-
eral business and other annual meeting items. In
all specifications where proposal categories are ex-
cluded, this is the base case (or omitted) category
from the regression.
Institutional Shareholder Services Vot-
ing Analytics Agenda IDs 10, 20, 40,
50, 60, 102-103, 106, 111, 113-115, 119,
122, 125-127, 131, 135, 137, 146, 148,
151, 159, 163, 168, 175-176, 179, 198-
199, 301-302, 304-310, 312-316, 319-
321, 323, 325, 328-334, 338-339, 342-
343, 353, 373-375, 377-379, 401, 404-
407, 409-415, 418-419, 452-454, 456-
457, 470, 601-603, 605-606, 609, 611-
618, 620-624, 627, 653, 658, and 660-
661.
Board Management sponsored proposals relating to the
board of directors, excluding director elections.
Institutional Shareholder Services Vot-
ing Analytics Agenda IDs 110, 178,
196, 202-209, 212-217, 223, 225-227,
229-235, 250, 255, 260-262, 264-265,
267, 271, 273, 276, 292, 296, 298-299,
604, and 607-608.
Payout Management sponsored proposals regarding divi-
dends, repurchases, and other payout plans.
Institutional Shareholder Services Vot-
ing Analytics Agenda IDs 107-108, 152,
318, 335, and 346-348.
Family TNA The sum of the total net assets across all funds
within a quarter for an institutional fund family.
CRSP Survivor-Bias Free Mutual Fund
Database variable tna latest.
Fund TNA The sum of the total net assets within for a fund,
across all share classes.
CRSP Survivor-Bias Free Mutual Fund
Database variable tna latest summed
at the crsp cl grp level.
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S&P 500 Fund An indicator variable with a value of 1 if a fund is
an S&P 500 index fund, and 0 otherwise.
CRSP Survivor-Bias Free Mutual Fund
Database variable lipper class equal to
“SPSP”.
Fund Age The age (in years) of the oldest share class of a
fund.
CRSP Survivor-Bias Free Mutual Fund
Database variable caldt minus the
first offer variable, using the minimum
first offer across a fund’s share classes.
Family Age The age (in years) of the oldest fund in an institu-
tional fund family.
CRSP Survivor-Bias Free Mutual Fund
Database variable caldt minus the
first offer variable, using the minimum
of first offer across all of a mgmt cd’s
funds.
Number of Funds The number of unique funds offered by an institu-
tional fund family in a quarter.
CRSP Survivor-Bias Free Mutual Fund
Database, using the unique crsp cl grps
within a mgmt cd for a given quarter.
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Appendix B: Variable Definitions for Chapter 2
Variable name Definition Data Source
Past fraud The firm committed a previously detected fraud SEC administrative proceeding or liti-
gation release was filed for firm prior to
firm-year observation
Past affiliated fraud An affiliate of the firm committed a previously de-
tected fraud
SEC administrative proceeding or lit-
igation release was filed for affiliated
firm prior to firm-year observation and
Form ADV Schedule D Section 7.A re-
ports fraud firm as affiliate
Past regulatory Filed a regulatory disclosure reporting page (DRP) One of more of: Items 11c1-3, 11d1-5,
11e-4
Past civil or criminal Filed a criminal or civil DRP One of more of: Items 11a1-2, 11b1-2,
11h1a, 11h1b, 11h1c, 11h2
Referral fees Do you or any related person, directly or indirectly,
compensate any person for client referrals?
Item 8f
Interest in transaction Do you or any related person: buy (or sell) securi-
ties from advisory clients; recommend securities in
which you have an ownership interest or serve as
underwriter, general or managing partner or have
any other sales interest?
One of more of: Items 8a1, 8a3, 8b2,
8b3
Soft dollars Do you or any related person receive research or
benefits other than execution from a broker-dealer
or a third party in connection with client securities
transactions?
Item 8e, Item 8g1 beginning in 2012
Broker in firm Employs registered representatives of a broker-
dealer
Item 5b240
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Investment Company
Act
Investment adviser (or sub-adviser) to an invest-
ment company registered under the Investment
Company Act
Item 2a4
Custody Do you or any related person have custody of any
advisory clients’ cash or securities?
One of more of: Items 9a1-2, 9b1-2
Dedicated CCO CCO has no other stated role within firm CCO on Schedule A has no other “Title
or Status”
Majority employee
owned
Over 50% aggregate employee ownership Imputed using Dimmock, Gerken, and
Marietta-Westberg (2015) method
Log (avg. acct. size) Logarithm of assets under management per client Log (Item 5f2c/(Item 5f2f + 1) + 1)
Percent client agents Percent of banking, mutual, pension, charitable,
corporate, and government clients
Sum of items: 5d3, 5d4, 5d5, 5d7, 5d8,
5d9 imputed using Dimmock, Gerken,
and Marietta-Westberg (2015) method
Hedge fund clients Primarily hedge fund clients Item 5d6 greater than or equal to 75%
Log (AUM) Logarithm of assets under management Log (Item 5f2c + 1)
Log (firm age) Logarithm of firm age in years Log (years since date registered with
the SEC)
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